Related papers: Non-obvious manipulability in division problems wi…
We initiate the study of external manipulations in Stable Marriage by considering several manipulative actions as well as several manipulation goals. For instance, one goal is to make sure that a given pair of agents is matched in a stable…
We provide a generalization of first-order necessary conditions of optimality for infinite-dimensional optimization problems with a finite number of inequality constraints and with a finite number of inequality and equality constraints. Our…
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s).…
We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such as…
Several concepts on the measure of observability, reachability, and robustness are defined and illustrated for both linear and nonlinear control systems. Defined by using computational dynamic optimization, these concepts are applicable to…
Coalition Logic is primarily concerned with what coalitions can achieve, whereas what coalitions cannot achieve -- their \emph{inability} -- has received comparatively little explicit attention. This asymmetry matters in artificial…
We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary feasibility constraints. It is constrained…
Under the assumption of (positive) homogeneity (PH in the sequel) of the corresponding utility functions, we construct polynomial time algorithms for the weak separability, the collective consumption behavior and some related problems.…
We propose a rigorous decomposition of predictive error, highlighting that not all 'irreducible' error is genuinely immutable. Many domains stand to benefit from iterative enhancements in measurement, construct validity, and modeling. Our…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…
We formulate the problem of fair and efficient completion of indivisible goods, defined as follows: Given a partial allocation of indivisible goods among agents, does there exist an allocation of the remaining goods (i.e., a completion)…
Constrained maximization of submodular functions poses a central problem in combinatorial optimization. In many realistic scenarios, a number of agents need to maximize multiple submodular objectives over the same ground set. We study such…
In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…
I study sequential contests where the efforts of earlier players may be disclosed to later players by nature or by design. The model has a range of applications, including rent seeking, R&D, oligopoly, public goods provision, and tragedy of…
In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, if there is a deviation from the promised mechanism, participants may be unable to detect it. We formalize a notion of auditabilty…
Coalitional manipulation in voting is considered to be any scenario in which a group of voters decide to misrepresent their vote in order to secure an outcome they all prefer to the first outcome of the election when they vote honestly. The…
We consider a social choice setting with agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups, and have metric preferences over a set of alternatives. Our goal is to choose a single alternative aiming to optimize various objectives that are…
When dealing with process calculi and automata which express both nondeterministic and probabilistic behavior, it is customary to introduce the notion of scheduler to solve the nondeterminism. It has been observed that for certain…
The class of assignment problems is a fundamental and well-studied class in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In a general assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a…
We consider the robust exponential utility maximization problem in discrete time: An investor maximizes the worst case expected exponential utility with respect to a family of nondominated probabilistic models of her endowment by…