Related papers: Replacement and Reputation
How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? Building on the work of Aragones et al. (2007), I study how…
We study a model of electoral accountability and selection whereby heterogeneous voters aggregate incumbent politician's performance data into personalized signals through paying limited attention. Extreme voters' signals exhibit an…
Despite many examples to the contrary, most models of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed. We present a model where elections are solely a public signal of the incumbent popularity, and citizens can protests…
A patient firm interacts with a sequence of consumers. The firm is either an honest type who supplies high quality and never erases its records, or an opportunistic type who chooses what quality to supply and may erase its records at a low…
What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats interact to implement policy. Both can either be good,…
We develop a model of electoral accountability with mainstream and alternative media. In addition to regular high- and low-competence types, the incumbent may be an aspiring autocrat who controls the mainstream media and will subvert…
In the name of meritocracy, modern economies devote increasing amounts of resources to quantifying and ranking the performance of individuals and organisations. Rankings send out powerful signals, which lead to identify the actions of top…
We study two-sided reputational bargaining with opportunities to issue an ultimatum -- threats to force dispute resolution. Each player is either a justified type, who never concedes and issues an ultimatum whenever an opportunity arrives,…
A fundamental decision faced by a firm hiring employees - and a familiar one to anyone who has dealt with the academic job market, for example - is deciding what caliber of candidates to pursue. Should the firm try to increase its…
We study how motivated reasoning affects the provision of climate policy in an electoral competition framework. Voters experience anticipatory disutility when future outcomes appear grim and may therefore distort beliefs in response to…
Some argue that political stability is best served through a two-party system. This study refutes this. The author mathematically defines the stability and rigidity of electoral systems comprised of any quantity of electors and parties. In…
Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are games in which players base their decisions…
This study considers a simple variation of the voter model with two competing parties. In particular, we represent the case of political elections, where people can choose to support one of the two candidates or to remain neutral. People…
A principal continually decides whether to approve resource allocations to an agent, who exerts private effort to remain eligible. The principal must perform costly inspections to determine the agent's eligibility. We characterize Markov…
Reputation is generally defined as the opinion of a group on an aspect of a thing. This paper presents a reputation model that follows a probabilistic modelling of opinions based on three main concepts: (1) the value of an opinion decays…
Participants in socio-economic systems are often ranked based on their performance. Rankings conveniently reduce the complexity of such systems to ordered lists. Yet, it has been shown in many contexts that those who reach the top are not…
Indirect reciprocity is a plausible mechanism for sustaining cooperation: people cooperate with those who have a good reputation, which can be acquired by helping others. However, this mechanism requires the population to agree on who has…
We study dynamic delegation with reputation feedback: a long-lived expert advises a sequence of implementers whose effort responds to current reputation, altering outcome informativeness and belief updates. We solve for a recursive,…
We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the median voter but is costly both financially and electorally. We…
There is growing evidence of systematic attempts to influence democratic elections by controlled and digitally organized dissemination of fake news. This raises the question of the intrinsic robustness of democratic electoral processes…