Related papers: Non-Compact Proofs
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
Let $\operatorname{Con}(\mathbf T)\!\restriction\!x$ denote the finite consistency statement "there are no proofs of contradiction in $\mathbf T$ with $\leq x$ symbols". For a large class of natural theories $\mathbf T$, Pudl\'ak has shown…
We offer a mathematical proof of consistency for Peano Arithmetic PA formalizable in PA. This result is compatible with Goedel's Second Incompleteness Theorem since our consistency proof does not rely on the representation of consistency as…
For Hilbert, the consistency of a formal theory T is an infinite series of statements "D is free of contradictions" for each derivation D and a consistency proof is i) an operation that, given D, yields a proof that D is free of…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
We describe a "slow" version of the hierarchy of uniform reflection principles over Peano Arithmetic ($\mathbf{PA}$). These principles are unprovable in Peano Arithmetic (even when extended by usual reflection principles of lower…
It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…
"[M]athematicians care no more for logic than logicians for mathematics." Augustus de Morgan, 1868. Proofs are traditionally syntactic, inductively generated objects. This paper presents an abstract mathematical formulation of propositional…
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
Does every Boolean tautology have a short propositional-calculus proof? Here, a propositional calculus (i.e. Frege) proof is a proof starting from a set of axioms and deriving new Boolean formulas using a set of fixed sound derivation…
A condition, in two variants, is given such that if a property P satisfies this condition, then every logic which is at least as strong as first-order logic and can express P fails to have the compactness property. The result is used to…
In this note, we show that, despite the widespread assumption, the consistency formula for Peano Arithmetic PA, Con(PA), "for all x, x is not a code of a derivation of (0=1)," is not equivalent in PA to the consistency of PA. Specifically,…
We study the logical complexity of proofs in cyclic arithmetic ($\mathsf{CA}$), as introduced in Simpson '17, in terms of quantifier alternations of formulae occurring. Writing $C\Sigma_n$ for (the logical consequences of) cyclic proofs…
The compactness theorem for a logic states, roughly, that the satisfiability of a set of well-formed formulas can be determined from the satisfiability of its finite subsets, and vice versa. Usually, proofs of this theorem depend on the…
We first partly develop a mathematical notion of stable consistency intended to reflect the actual consistency property of human beings. Then we give a generalization of the first and second G\"odel incompleteness theorem to stably…
A formula $\phi$ is called \emph{$n$-provable} in a formal arithmetical theory $S$ if $\phi$ is provable in $S$ together with all true arithmetical $\Pi_{n}$-sentences taken as additional axioms. While in general the set of all $n$-provable…
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem says that for every sufficiently rich formal theory (containing formal arithmetic in some natural sense) there exist true unprovable statements. Such statements would be natural candidates for being…
Proofs are traditionally syntactic, inductively generated objects. This paper reformulates first-order logic (predicate calculus) with proofs which are graph-theoretic rather than syntactic. It defines a combinatorial proof of a formula…
In this paper we propose an interpretation for self-referential propositions in a "meta-model" N* of ZF. This meta-model N* is considered as an informal model of arithmetic that mathematicians often use when working with number theory.…
The famous G\"odel incompleteness theorem states that for every consistent sufficiently rich formal theory T there exist true statements that are unprovable in T. Such statements would be natural candidates for being added as axioms, but…