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We introduce a minimal evolutionary model to show how local cooperation and global competition can create a transition to the diversity of communities such as linguistic groups. By using a lattice model with high-dimensional state agents…
Boosting algorithms enjoy strong theoretical guarantees: when weak learners maintain positive edge, AdaBoost achieves geometric decrease of exponential loss. We study how to incorporate group fairness constraints into boosting while…
Trading a financial asset pushes its price as well as the prices of other assets, a phenomenon known as cross-impact. We consider a general class of kernel-based cross-impact models and investigate suitable parameterisations for trading…
We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers…
\noindent We study the asymptotic behavior of a sum of independent and identically distributed random variables conditioned by a sum of independent and identically distributed integer-valued random variables. We prove a Berry-Esseen bound…
We consider allocating indivisible goods with provable fairness guarantees that are satisfied regardless of which bundle of items each agent receives. Symmetrical allocations of this type are known to exist for divisible resources, such as…
We develop a tractable identification approach for strategic network formation models with both strategic link interdependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity (fixed effects). The key challenge is that endogenous network statistics…
We study the fundamental mistake bound and sample complexity in the strategic classification, where agents can strategically manipulate their feature vector up to an extent in order to be predicted as positive. For example, given a…
We study the problem of computing a conjunctive query q in parallel, using p of servers, on a large database. We consider algorithms with one round of communication, and study the complexity of the communication. We are especially…
Consider a barter exchange problem over a finite set of agents, where each agent owns an item and is also associated with a (privately known) wish list of items belonging to the other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of…
When information acquisition is costly but flexible, a principal may rationally acquire information that favors one group over another. The former group faces incentives to invest in becoming productive, while the latter is discouraged from…
Bounded rationality is an important consideration stemming from the fact that agents often have limits on their processing abilities, making the assumption of perfect rationality inapplicable to many real tasks. We propose an…
A probabilistic approach to the epidemic evolution on realistic social-contact networks allows for characteristic differences among subjects, including the individual number and structure of social contacts, and the heterogeneity of the…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
Bilateral markets, such as those for government bonds, involve decentralized and opaque transactions between market makers (MMs) and clients, posing significant challenges for traditional modeling approaches. To address these complexities,…
Incremental learning is useful if an AI agent needs to integrate data from a stream. The problem is non trivial if the agent runs on a limited computational budget and has a bounded memory of past data. In a deep learning approach, the…
We consider a simple model of rational agents competing in a single product market described by simple linear demand curve. Contrary to accepted economic theory, the agents' production levels synchronise in the absence of conscious…
We investigate a spectrum oligopoly market where primaries lease their channels to secondaries in lieu of financial remuneration. Transmission quality of a channel evolves randomly. Each primary has to select the price it would quote…
We present an efficient technique, which allows to train classification networks which are verifiably robust against norm-bounded adversarial attacks. This framework is built upon the work of Gowal et al., who applies the interval…
We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…