Related papers: Procurement Auctions with Predictions: Improved Fr…
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…
Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that…
The issue of fairness in AI arises from discriminatory practices in applications like job recommendations and risk assessments, emphasising the need for algorithms that do not discriminate based on group characteristics. This concern is…
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. While there has been a lot of attention on the auction process and its game-theoretic aspects, our focus is on the advertisers. In particular,…
We study the problem of searching for a target at some unknown location in $\mathbb{R}^d$ when additional information regarding the position of the target is available in the form of predictions. In our setting, predictions come as…
Among the many challenges of integrating renewable energy sources into the existing power grid, is the challenge of integrating renewable energy generators into the power systems economy. Electricity markets currently are run in a way that…
We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are…
We consider repeated multi-unit auctions with uniform pricing, which are widely used in practice for allocating goods such as carbon licenses. In each round, $K$ identical units of a good are sold to a group of buyers that have valuations…
In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in…
We study the efficiency guarantees in the simple auction environment where the auctioneer has one unit of divisible good to be distributed among a number of budget constrained agents. With budget constraints, the social welfare cannot be…
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely…
We introduce the notion of rigidity in auction design and use it to analyze some fundamental aspects of mechanism design. We focus on single-item auctions where the values of the bidders are drawn from some (possibly correlated)…
We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…
We consider the problem of bid prediction in repeated auctions and evaluate the performance of econometric methods for learning agents using a dataset from a mainstream sponsored search auction marketplace. Sponsored search auctions is a…
The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may generate little or no revenue. Unfortunately, the…
We develop multiattribute auctions that accommodate generalized additive independent (GAI) preferences. We propose an iterative auction mechanism that maintains prices on potentially overlapping GAI clusters of attributes, thus decreases…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of appealing properties, including obvious strategyproofness, transparency, and unconditional…
We introduce a strategic decision-making problem faced by logistics providers (LPs) seeking facility location decisions that lead to profitable operations. The profitability depends on the revenue generated through agreements with shippers,…