Related papers: Procurement Auctions with Predictions: Improved Fr…
Prediction APIs offered for a fee are a fast-growing industry and an important part of machine learning as a service. While many such services are available, the heterogeneity in their price and performance makes it challenging for users to…
In this paper, we study a facility location problem within a competitive market context, where customer demand is predicted by a random utility choice model. Unlike prior research, which primarily focuses on simple constraints such as a…
We studied the Fault-Tolerant Facility Placement problem (FTFP) which generalizes the uncapacitated facility location problem (UFL). In FTFP, we are given a set F of sites at which facilities can be built, and a set C of clients with some…
Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial…
From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…
In this paper, we provide a rigorous theoretical investigation of an online learning version of the Facility Location problem which is motivated by emerging problems in real-world applications. In our formulation, we are given a set of…
This paper considers an electric vehicle charging scheduling setting where vehicle users can reserve charging time in advance at a charging station. In this setting, users are allowed to explicitly express their preferences over different…
We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate…
A speculator can take advantage of a procurement auction by acquiring items for sale before the auction. The accumulated market power can then be exercised in the auction and may lead to a large enough gain to cover the acquisition costs. I…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…
We study a variant of the competitive facility location problem, in which a company is to locate new facilities in a market where competitor's facilities already exist. We consider the scenario where only a limited number of possible…
We study the aggregate welfare and individual regret guarantees of dynamic \emph{pacing algorithms} in the context of repeated auctions with budgets. Such algorithms are commonly used as bidding agents in Internet advertising platforms,…
We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The reward obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent…
We consider the optimization problem of a multi-resource, multi-unit VCG auction that produces an optimal, i.e., non-approximated, social welfare. We present an algorithm that solves this optimization problem with pseudo-polynomial…
Auctions for perishable goods such as internet ad inventory need to make real-time allocation and pricing decisions as the supply of the good arrives in an online manner, without knowing the entire supply in advance. These allocation and…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…
We revisit the discrete heterogeneous two-facility location problem, in which there is a set of agents that occupy nodes of a line graph, and have private approval preferences over two facilities. When the facilities are located at some…
Facility location is fundamental in operations research, mechanism design, and algorithmic game theory, with applications ranging from urban infrastructure planning to distributed systems. Recent research in this area has focused on…