Related papers: Coordinate-free utility theory
We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is introduced whose unique solution is the social welfare…
Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii)…
This paper considers a novel problem of how to choose an appropriate geometry for a group of agents with only shape constraints but with a flexible scale. Instead of assigning the formation system with a specific geometry, here the only…
We study preferences estimated from finite choice experiments and provide sufficient conditions for convergence to a unique underlying "true" preference. Our conditions are weak, and therefore valid in a wide range of economic environments.…
The fundamental assignment problem is in search of welfare maximization mechanisms to allocate items to agents when the private preferences over indivisible items are provided by self-interested agents. The mainstream mechanism…
Agents care not only about the outcomes of collective decisions but also about how decisions are made. In many cases, both the outcome and the procedure affect whether agents see a decision as legitimate, justifiable, or acceptable. We…
Determining consumer preferences and utility is a foundational challenge in economics. They are central in determining consumer behaviour through the utility-maximising consumer decision-making process. However, preferences and utilities…
How should well-being be prioritised in society, and what trade-offs are people willing to make between fairness and personal well-being? We investigate these questions using a stated preference experiment with a nationally representative…
Influence diagrams provide a compact graphical representation of decision problems. Several algorithms for the quick computation of their associated expected utilities are available in the literature. However, often they rely on a full…
Given a linearly ordered set I, every surjective map p: A --> I endows the set A with a structure of set of preferences by "replacing" the elements of I with their inverse images via p considered as "balloons" (sets endowed with an…
We propose a novel and efficient algorithm for the collaborative preference completion problem, which involves jointly estimating individualized rankings for a set of entities over a shared set of items, based on a limited number of…
The class of assignment problems is a fundamental and well-studied class in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In a general assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a…
In several socioeconomic-critical decision-making settings, such as fair resource allocation, climate policy, or AI alignment, multiple principals interact within a common arena. While it is well established that these principals may have…
The paper discusses an applicability criterion for a cutoff regularization in the coordinate representation in the Euclidean space with a dimension larger than two. It is shown that the set of functions satisfying the criterion is not…
We construct a new kind of measures, called projection families, which generalize the classical notion of vector and operator-valued measures. The maximal class of reasonable functions admits an integral with respect to a projection family,…
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…
A multicriteria group choice problem is considered in the paper. The model includes a set of feasible alternatives, a vector criterion, and n preference relations of the decision makers (DMs). Each preference relation is a cone relation…
This paper axiomatizes, in a two-stage setup, a new theory for decision under risk and ambiguity. The axiomatized preference relation $\succeq$ on the space $\tilde{V}$ of random variables induces an ambiguity index $c$ on the space…
Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…
The U(1) gauge theory on a space with Lie type noncommutativity is constructed. The construction is based on the group of translation in Fourier space, which in contrast to space itself is commutative. In analogy with lattice gauge theory,…