Related papers: Regulating a Monopolist without Subsidy
When sales of a product are affected by randomness in demand, retailers can use dynamic pricing strategies to maximise their profits. In this article the pricing problem is formulated as a stochastic optimal control problem, where the…
In this paper, the optimal pricing strategy in Avellande-Stoikov's for a monopolistic dealer is extended to a general situation where multiple dealers are present in a competitive market. The dealers' trading intensities, their optimal bid…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and…
What is the best macroprudential regulation when households differ in their exposure to profits from the financial sector? To answer the question, I study a real business cycle model with household heterogeneity and market incompleteness.…
We present tight bounds and heuristics for personalized, multi-product pricing problems. Under mild conditions we show that the best price in the direction of a positive vector results in profits that are guaranteed to be at least as large…
Autonomous vehicles will be an integral part of ride-sharing services in the future. This setting differs from traditional ride-sharing marketplaces because of the absence of the supply side (drivers). However, it has far-reaching…
We reexamine a recently proposed non-inflationary solution to the monopole problem, based on the possibility that spontaneously broken Grand-Unified symmetries do not get restored at high temperature. We go beyond leading order by studying…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
Incentives in experimental design are often misaligned: experimenters design and finance experiments to seek regulatory approval, while regulators seek to maximize social-welfare. We propose a framework to resolve this conflict, wherein…
Demand response (DR) has been demonstrated to be an effective method for reducing peak load and mitigating uncertainties on both the supply and demand sides of the electricity market. One critical question for DR research is how to…
Unlike telephone operators, which pay termination fees to reach the users of another network, Internet Content Providers (CPs) do not pay the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of users they reach. While the consequent cross subsidization to…
A platform charges a producer for disclosing quality evidence to consumers before trade. It aims to maximize its revenue guarantee across potentially multiple equilibria which arise from the interdependence of producer purchase decisions…
This paper examines how regulation can push an oligopoly from one pricing regime to another. It uses rich data from Chilean pharmacy chains to study a ban on comparative price advertising. Before the ban, ads created demand spillovers…
We have used agent-based modeling as our numerical method to artificially simulate a dynamic real economy where agents are rational maximizers of an objective function of Cobb-Douglas type. The economy is characterised by heterogeneous…
In this paper, I consider a simple heterogeneous agents model of a production economy with uncertain climate change and examine constrained efficient carbon taxation. If there are frictionless, complete financial markets, the simple model…
We consider a setting where goods are allocated to agents by way of an allocation platform (e.g., a matching platform). An ``allocation facilitator'' aims to increase the overall utility/social-good of the allocation by encouraging (some of…
In the early $20^{th}$ century, Pigou observed that imposing a marginal cost tax on the usage of a public good induces a socially efficient level of use as an equilibrium. Unfortunately, such a "Pigouvian" tax may also induce other,…
Classical spatial models predict platform convergence, yet empirical polarization persists. This paper proposes a non-electoral mechanism: lobbying as a monopsonistic market for legislative support. Here, extreme benefactors must pay more…
We consider the problem of planning the aggregate energy consumption for a set of thermostatically controlled loads for demand response, accounting price forecast trajectory and thermal comfort constraints. We address this as a…