Related papers: A poset representation for stable contracts in a t…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
This paper introduces a novel robust trading paradigm, called \textit{multi-double linear policies}, situated within a \textit{generalized} lattice market. Distinctively, our framework departs from most existing robust trading strategies,…
We present a method for linear stability analysis of systems with parametric uncertainty formulated in the stochastic Galerkin framework. Specifically, we assume that for a model partial differential equation, the parameter is given in the…
In this paper we consider the classical problem of computing linear extensions of a given poset which is well known to be a difficult problem. However, in our setting the elements of the poset are multivariate polynomials, and only a small…
We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in…
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…
Consider a cyclically ordered collection of $r$ equinumerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union…
We perform a theoretical study of the coupled dynamics of two species of Bose-Einstein condensates (BECs) in a double well potential where both the tunneling and the interatomic interactions are driven periodically in time. The population…
We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is…
The partition lattice and noncrossing partition lattice are well studied objects in combinatorics. Given a graph $G$ on vertex set $\{1,2,\dots, n\}$, its bond lattice, $L_G$, is the subposet of the partition lattice formed by restricting…
An {\em arrangement} of an ordered pair $(G_A, G_M)$ of graphs is defined as a function $f$ from $V(G_A)$ to $V(G_M)$ such that, for each vertex $c$ of $G_M$, the vertex-set $f^{-1}(c)$ of $G_A$ either is $\emptyset$ (the case when $c…
In two-sided matching markets with contracts, quantile (or generalized median) stable mechanisms represent an interesting class that produces stable allocations which can be viewed as compromises between both sides of the market. These…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
A careful study is made of embeddings of posets which have a convex range. We observe that such embeddings share nice properties with the homomorphisms of more restrictive categories; for example, we show that every order embedding between…
The existence of a (partial) market equilibrium price is proved in a complete, continuous time finite-agent market setting. The economic agents act as price takers in a fully competitive setting and maximize exponential utility from…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
In this paper we introduce and study the poset of equivalence classes of subgroups of a finite group $G$, induced by the isomorphism relation. This contains the well-known lattice of solitary subgroups of $G$. We prove that in several…
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of $n$ actions, via a linear contract. Computing the optimal contract is a…
We study the minimum number of constraints needed to formulate random instances of the maximum stable set problem via linear programs (LPs), in two distinct models. In the uniform model, the constraints of the LP are not allowed to depend…
Comparator circuit model was originally introduced by Mayr and Subramanian (1992) (and further studied by Cook, Filmus and Le (2012)) to capture problems which are not known to be P-complete but still not known to admit efficient parallel…