Related papers: A poset representation for stable contracts in a t…
In the stable allocation problem on a two-sided market introduced and studied by Baiou and Balinski in the early 2000's, one is given a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with capacities $b$ on the edges (``contracts'') and quotas $q$ on the…
We consider one variant of stable assignment problems in a bipartite graph endowed with nonnegative capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices. It can be viewed as a generalization of the stable allocation problem introduced by…
We revisit the problem of existence of stable systems of contracts with arbitrary sets of contracts. We show that stable sets of contracts exists if choices of agents satisfy path-independence. We call such choice functions Plott functions.…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We consider a far generalization of the well-known stable roommates and non-bipartite stable allocation problems. In its setting, one is given a finite non-bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with nonnegative integer edge capacities $b(e)\in{\mathbb…
We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices $i\in I$ are interpreted as agents, and the edges $c\in C$ as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent…
Birkhoff's representation theorem (Birkhoff, 1937) defines a bijection between elements of a distributive lattice and the family of upper sets of an associated poset. Although not used explicitly, this result is at the backbone of the…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…
We prove a simple formula for arbitrary cluster variables in the marked surfaces model. As part of the formula, we associate a labeled poset to each tagged arc, such that the associated $F$-polynomial is a weighted sum of order ideals. Each…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We extend the notion of stability in the non-abelian category of poset representations (introduced by Futorny and Iusenko) to the category of socle-projective representations of a given $r$-peak poset $\P$. When $\P$ is a poset of type…
A longer and more correct title is `a short and direct path to the theory of stable contract systems in a bipartite market'. There is no new meaningful results in the article. It is dedicated to the presentation of a short method for…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We introduce two polynomials (in $q$) associated with a finite poset $P$ that encode some information on the covering relation in $P$. If $P$ is a distributive lattice, and hence $P$ is isomorphic to the poset of dual order ideals in a…
In this paper, we study the relations between the numerical structure of the optimal solutions of a convex programming problem defined on the edge set of a simple graph and the stability number (i.e. the maximum size of a subset of pairwise…
We consider an occupation market in which preferences of members are treated as non linear general increasing functions. The arrangement of members is separated into two non over-lapping sets, set of workers and set of firms. We consider…
We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its…
We introduce two variants of the poset saturation problem. For a poset $P$ and the Boolean lattice $\mathcal{B}_n$, a family $\mathcal{F}$ of sets, not necessarily from $\mathcal{B}_n$, is \textit{projective $P$-saturated} if (i) it does…