Related papers: On Dynamic Programming Theory for Leader-Follower …
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…
We investigate the temporal concatenation of sub-policies in Markov Decision Processes (MDP) with time-varying reward functions. We introduce General Dijkstra Search (GDS), and prove that globally optimal goal-reaching policies can be…
In this paper, a hierarchical one-leader-multi-followers game for a class of continuous-time nonlinear systems with disturbance is investigated by a novel policy iteration reinforcement learning technique in which, the game model consists…
The linear Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework offers a principled foundation for reinforcement learning (RL) with strong theoretical guarantees and sample efficiency. However, its restrictive assumption-that both transition dynamics…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic (LQ) Stackelberg mean field games of backward-forward stochastic systems, involving a backward leader and a substantial number of forward followers. The leader initiates by providing its…
Multistage stochastic programming deals with operational and planning problems that involve a sequence of decisions over time while responding to realizations that are uncertain. Algorithms designed to address multistage stochastic linear…
The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…
This paper investigates a robust incentive Stackelberg stochastic differential game problem for a linear-quadratic mean field system, where the model uncertainty appears in the drift term of the leader's state equation. Moreover, both the…
We propose projection-free sequential algorithms for linear-quadratic dynamics games. These policy gradient based algorithms are akin to Stackelberg leadership model and can be extended to model-free settings. We show that if the leader…
This paper obtains the maximum principle for both stochastic (global) open-loop and stochastic (global) closed-loop Stackelberg differential games. For the closed-loop case, we use the theory of controlled forward-backward stochastic…
Stackelberg games have been widely used to model interactive decision-making problems in a variety of domains such as energy systems, transportation, cybersecurity, and human-robot interaction. However, existing algorithms for solving…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
Computing worst-case robust strategies in pursuit-evasion games (PEGs) is time-consuming, especially when real-world factors like partial observability are considered. While important for general security purposes, real-time applicable…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time Stackelberg mean field game with a leader and an infinite number of followers. The leader and the followers each observe types privately that evolve as conditionally independent controlled Markov…
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
Systematic scenario generation (SG) methods have emerged as an invaluable tool to handle uncertainty towards the efficient solution of stochastic programming (SP) problems. The quality of SG methods depends on their consistency to generate…
We consider a broad class of dynamic programming (DP) problems that involve a partially linear structure and some positivity properties in their system equation and cost function. We address deterministic and stochastic problems, possibly…
Information gathering while interacting with other agents under sensing and motion uncertainty is critical in domains such as driving, service robots, racing, or surveillance. The interests of agents may be at odds with others, resulting in…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…