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Recent defenses for safeguarding open-weight large language models (LLMs) are intended to prevent adversarial usage. Underlying these defenses is an assumption that new harmful behavior is learned through fine-tuning rather than elicited by…
Aligned LLMs are secure, capable of recognizing and refusing to answer malicious questions. However, the role of internal parameters in maintaining such security is not well understood yet, further these models can be vulnerable to security…
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become powerful tools for complex problem solving, but their structured reasoning pathways can lead to unsafe outputs when exposed to harmful prompts. Existing safety alignment methods reduce harmful…
Federated learning (FL) enables multiple parties to collaboratively fine-tune an large language model (LLM) without the need of direct data sharing. Ideally, by training on decentralized data that is aligned with human preferences and…
Pre-trained large models for multimodal contrastive learning, such as CLIP, have been widely recognized in the industry as highly susceptible to data-poisoned backdoor attacks. This poses significant risks to downstream model training. In…
While supervised fine-tuning (SFT) has been a straightforward approach for tailoring the output of foundation large language model (LLM) to specific preferences, concerns have been raised about the depth of this alignment, with some…
Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) is the standard paradigm for domain adaptation, yet it frequently incurs the cost of catastrophic forgetting. In sharp contrast, on-policy Reinforcement Learning (RL) effectively preserves general capabilities.…
Large language model (LLM) alignment algorithms typically consist of post-training over preference pairs. While such algorithms are widely used to enable safety guardrails and align LLMs with general human preferences, we show that…
Prefill attacks are an effective and low-cost jailbreaking method, as they directly insert an acceptance sequence (e.g., "Sure, here is how to...") at the start of an LLM's output and lead the model to continue the response. We make two…
Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is a method for enhancing model performance by directly optimizing for the preferences or rankings of outcomes, instead of traditional loss functions. This approach has proven effective in aligning Large…
The fine-tuning of pre-trained language models has a great success in many NLP fields. Yet, it is strikingly vulnerable to adversarial examples, e.g., word substitution attacks using only synonyms can easily fool a BERT-based sentiment…
As large language models (LLMs) continue to grow in capability, so do the risks of harmful misuse through fine-tuning. While most prior studies assume that attackers rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) for such misuse, we systematically…
Safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has recently become a critical objective of model developers. In response, a growing body of work has been investigating how safety alignment can be bypassed through various jailbreaking…
Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms for safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), encounter the challenge of distribution shift. Current approaches typically address this issue…
Existing works show that augmenting the training data of pre-trained language models (PLMs) for classification tasks fine-tuned via parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods (PEFT) using both clean and adversarial examples can enhance their…
Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) has become a crucial step for aligning pretrained large language models (LLMs) using supervised datasets of input-output pairs. However, despite being supervised, SFT is inherently limited by its generative…
Large language models (LLMs) often contain misleading content, emphasizing the need to align them with human values to ensure secure AI systems. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has been employed to achieve this alignment.…
Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit strong but shallow alignment: they directly refuse harmful queries when a refusal is expected at the very start of an assistant turn, yet this protection collapses once a harmful continuation is underway…
Large reasoning models (LRMs) extend large language models by generating explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, significantly improving mathematical and logical problem solving. However, this explicit reasoning process also introduces…
Neural language models (LMs) are vulnerable to training data extraction attacks due to data memorization. This paper introduces a novel attack scenario wherein an attacker adversarially fine-tunes pre-trained LMs to amplify the exposure of…