Related papers: Solving Multiparametric Generalized Nash Equilibri…
In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…
In this paper, we solve the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in merely monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous semi-decentralized solution algorithm without projections that uses first-order information…
In dynamic games with shared constraints, Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE) are often computed using the normalized solution concept, which assumes identical Lagrange multipliers for shared constraints across all players. While widely used,…
We study generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems in games with quadratic costs and individual linear equality constraints. Departing from approaches that require strong monotonicity and/or shared constraints, we reformulate the KKT…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
Dynamic games can be an effective approach to modeling interactive behavior between multiple non-cooperative agents and they provide a theoretical framework for simultaneous prediction and control in such scenarios. In this work, we propose…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…
In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
This paper studies convex Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs) that are given by polynomials. We use rational and parametric expressions for Lagrange multipliers to formulate efficient polynomial optimization for computing…
Generalized Nash equilibria are used in multi-agent control applications to model strategic interactions between agents that are coupled in the cost, dynamics, and constraints, and provide the foundations for game-theoretic MPC (Receding…
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…
In Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT), a population reaches a Nash equilibrium when none of the agents can improve its objective by solely changing its strategy on its own. Roughly speaking, this equilibrium is a protection against betrayal.…
This paper proposes the first fully distributed algorithm for finding the Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) of a non-cooperative game with shared coupling constraints and general cost coupling at a user-prescribed finite time T. As a…
This paper presents an exact penalization theory of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) that has its origin from the renowned Arrow-Debreu general economic equilibrium model. While the latter model is the foundation of much of…
In this paper, we consider the problem of learning a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in strongly monotone games. First, we propose a novel continuous-time solution algorithm that uses regular projections and first-order information. As…
Dynamic games can be an effective approach for modeling interactive behavior between multiple competitive agents in autonomous racing and they provide a theoretical framework for simultaneous prediction and control in such scenarios. In…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with non-convex strategy spaces and non-convex cost functions. This general class of games includes the important case of games with mixed-integer variables for which only a few…
We study connections between optimistic bilevel programming problems and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEP)s. We remark that, when addressing bilevel problems, we consider the general case in which the lower level program is not…
This paper presents a new primal-dual method for computing an equilibrium of generalized (continuous) Nash game (referred to as generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP)) where each player's feasible strategy set depends on the other…