Related papers: Timely Information for Strategic Persuasion

The well-known influence maximization problem aims at maximizing the influence of one information cascade in a social network by selecting appropriate seed users prior to the diffusion process. In its adaptive version, additional seed users…

We study how a principal can jointly shape an agent's timing and action through information. We develop a revelation principle: with intertemporal commitment, the problem simplifies to choosing a joint distribution over stopping times and…

We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…

In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to…

This paper studies a multi-player, general-sum stochastic game characterized by a dual-stage temporal structure per period. The agents face uncertainty regarding the time-evolving state that is realized at the beginning of each period.…

This paper investigates the problem of minimizing the Age of Incorrect Information (AoII) when the communication channel has a random delay. We consider a slotted-time system where a transmitter observes a dynamic source and decides when to…

In time-critical settings such as assistive driving, assistants often rely on alerts or haptic signals to prompt rapid human attention, but these cues usually leave humans to interpret situations and decide responses independently,…

Political and advertising campaigns increasingly exploit social networks to spread information and persuade people. This paper studies a persuasion model to examine whether such a strategy is better than simply sending public signals.…

In this paper, we study a distributed parameter estimation problem with an asynchronous communication protocol over multi-agent systems. Different from traditional time-driven communication schemes, in this work, data can be transmitted…

This paper I assume that in humans the creation of knowledge depends on a discrete time, or stage, sequential decision-making process subjected to a stochastic, information transmitting environment. For each time-stage, this environment…

In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that has to make the hiring decision. The…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

This paper considers the dynamics of cheap talk interactions between an oblivious receiver and a sender with different amounts of information. Even though it may seem that having additional information about the state of the game is always…

Motivated by applications in cyber security, we develop a simple game model for describing how a learning agent's private information influences an observing agent's inference process. The model describes a situation in which one of the…

If a sender in a persuasion game can use a sequence of experiments rather than a single experiment, does this change the sender's value? We show that the sender can benefit more from dynamic persuasion than from static persuasion when the…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…

In the same way that subsequent pauses in spoken language are used to convey information, it is also possible to transmit information in communication networks not only by message content, but also with its timing. This paper presents an…

We study the problem of an agent continuously faced with the decision of placing or not placing trust in an institution. The agent makes use of Bayesian learning in order to estimate the institution's true trustworthiness and makes the…

It is common in recommendation systems that users both consume and produce information as they make strategic choices under uncertainty. While a social planner would balance "exploration" and "exploitation" using a multi-armed bandit…

We study a Bayesian persuasion setting with binary actions (adopt and reject) for Receiver. We examine the following question - how well can Sender perform, in terms of persuading Receiver to adopt, when ignorant of Receiver's utility? We…