Related papers: Hierarchies of Beliefs and Measurable Uniformizati…
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respectively, common knowledge) of players' rationality defined by…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
This paper provides an analysis of different formal representations of beliefs in epistemic game theory. The aim is to attempt a synthesis of different structures of beliefs in the presence of indeterminate probabilities. Special attention…
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…
We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both…
We characterize three interrelated concepts in epistemic game theory: permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We define the lexicographic epistemic model for a game with incomplete information. Based on it, we…
The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…
Selection of input features such as relevant pieces of text has become a common technique of highlighting how complex neural predictors operate. The selection can be optimized post-hoc for trained models or incorporated directly into the…
Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated…
Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…
We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which…
This book summarizes ongoing research introducing probability space isomorphic mappings into the strategy spaces of game theory. This approach is motivated by discrepancies between probability theory and game theory when applied to the same…
This paper studies the rationalization and identification of binary games where players have correlated private types. Allowing for correlation is crucial in global games and in models with social interactions as it represents correlated…
Generalizing a result of Kiss, we provide a game that characterizes Baire class 1 functions between arbitrary separable metrizable spaces. We show that the determinacy of our game is equivalent to a generalization of Baire's grand theorem,…
We extend Solovay's theorem about definable subsets of the Baire space to the generalized Baire space ${}^\lambda\lambda$, where $\lambda$ is an uncountable cardinal with $\lambda^{<\lambda}=\lambda$. In the first main theorem, we show that…
In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…