Related papers: Virtual Observability in Sequential Play
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Understanding cooperation in social systems is challenging because the ever-changing rules that govern societies interact with individual actions, resulting in intricate collective outcomes. In virtual-world experiments, we allowed people…
In the standard setting of approachability there are two players and a target set. The players play repeatedly a known vector-valued game where the first player wants to have the average vector-valued payoff converge to the target set which…
We present a Stackelberg game model to investigate how individuals make their decisions on timing and route selection. Group formation can naturally result from these decisions, but only when individuals arrive at the same time and choose…
Considering feedback of collective actions of cooperation on common resources has vital importance to reach sustainability. But such efforts may have not immediate consequence on the state of environment and it is unclear how they influence…
Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…
The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…
Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…
Inspired by Martin Fr\"anzle's persistent and influential work on capturing and handling delay inherent to cyber-physical systems in the formal verification of such systems, we study timed games where controllable actions do not take effect…
Cooperative behavior lies at the very basis of human societies, yet its evolutionary origin remains a key unsolved puzzle. Whereas reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the…
This paper investigates the discrete-time asynchronous games in which noncooperative agents seek to minimize their individual cost functions. Building on the assumption of partial asynchronism, i.e., each agent updates at least once within…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
We derive robust predictions in games involving flexible information acquisition, also known as rational inattention (Sims 2003). These predictions remain accurate regardless of the specific methods players employ to gather information.…
The abelian sandpile model is a simple combinatorial model for critical behaviour which has the "abelian property" that the order in which we make moves does not change the final outcome of the game. This might seem to restrict the model's…
In this paper we investigate a differential game in which countably many dynamical objects pursue a single one. All the players perform simple motions. The duration of the game is fixed. The controls of a group of pursuers are subject to…
Predicting selfish behavior in public environments by considering Nash equilibria is a central concept of game theory. For the dynamic traffic assignment problem modeled by a flow over time game, in which every particle tries to reach its…
This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…
We study self-triggered two-player stochastic games on Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes (PDMPs) where each agent decides when to observe and which open-loop action to hold. Augmenting the state with clocks and committed controls…
The field of Game Theory provides a useful mechanism for modeling many decision-making scenarios. In participating in these scenarios individuals and groups adopt particular strategies, which generally perform with varying levels of…