Related papers: Monopolistic Data Dumping
A big data service is any data-originated resource that is offered over the Internet. The performance of a big data service depends on the data bought from the data collectors. However, the problem of optimal pricing and data allocation in…
I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before…
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely…
With the rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence technologies, data has become an important strategic resource in the new era. However, the growing demand for data has exacerbated the issue of \textit{data…
We study the costs and benefits of selling data to a competitor. Although selling all consumers' data may decrease total firm profits, there exist other selling mechanisms -- in which only some consumers' data is sold -- that render both…
We study a censored variant of the data-driven newsvendor problem, where the decision-maker must select an ordering quantity that minimizes expected overage and underage costs based only on offline censored sales data, rather than…
We study the robust sequential screening problem of a monopolist seller of multiple cloud computing services facing a buyer who has private information about his demand distribution for these services. At the time of contracting, the buyer…
We examine the implications of consumer privacy when preferences today depend upon past consumption choices, and consumers shop from different sellers in each period. Although consumers are ex ante identical, their initial consumption…
We study the identification and estimation of a multidimensional screening model, where a monopolist sells a multi-attribute product to consumers with private information about their multidimensional preferences. Under optimal screening,…
An information broker incentivizes consumers to share their information, while designing an information structure to shape the market segmentation. The information broker is a metaphor for an Internet platform that matches consumers with…
We study the following problem that is motivated by Blockchains where ``miners'' are serially given the monopoly for assembling transactions into the next block. Our model has a single good that is sold repeatedly every day where new demand…
In this note, we consider the pricing problem of a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces naive consumers with convex self-control preferences.
A sender with private preferences would like to influence a receiver's action by providing information through a statistical test. The technology for information production is controlled by a monopolist intermediary, who offers a menu of…
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with $m$ heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her…
We study how to optimally segment monopolistic markets with a redistributive objective. We characterize optimal redistributive segmentations and show that they (i) induce the seller to price progressively, i.e., charge richer consumers…
We study the multi-item mechanism design problem where a monopolist sells $n$ heterogeneous items to a single buyer. We focus on buy-many mechanisms, a natural class of mechanisms frequently used in practice. The buy-many property allows…
We consider a monopoly insurance market with a risk-neutral profit-maximizing insurer and a consumer with Yaari Dual Utility preferences that distort the given continuous loss distribution. The insurer observes the loss distribution but not…
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a robust-design approach. We solve for the policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where the regret is the difference between his complete-information payoff minus his…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…
Recently, the mobile network operators (MNOs) are exploring more time flexibility with the rollover data plan, which allows the unused data from the previous month to be used in the current month. Motivated by this industry trend, we…