Related papers: Designing Rules for Choosing a Winner in a Debate

We study the problem of agent selection in causal strategic learning under multiple decision makers and address two key challenges that come with it. Firstly, while much of prior work focuses on studying a fixed pool of agents that remains…

In Reinforcement Learning interpretability generally means to provide insight into the agent's mechanisms such that its decisions are understandable by an expert upon inspection. This definition, with the resulting methods from the…

The intent of control argumentation frameworks is to specifically model strategic scenarios from the perspective of an agent by extending the standard model of argumentation framework in a way that takes unquantified uncertainty regarding…

When robots share the same workspace with other intelligent agents (e.g., other robots or humans), they must be able to reason about the behaviors of their neighboring agents while accomplishing the designated tasks. In practice,…

We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal, giving some…

In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…

From marketing to politics, exploitation of incomplete information through selective communication of arguments is ubiquitous. In this work, we focus on development of an argumentation-theoretic model for manipulable multi-agent…

We study the classical discursive dilemma from the point of view of finding the best decision rule according to a quantitative criterion, under very mild restrictions on the set of admissible rules. The members of the deciding committee are…

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…

We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncertainty is modeled as a probability distribution over agent's…

This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…

Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…

We consider multi-agent systems where agents' preferences are aggregated via sequential majority voting: each decision is taken by performing a sequence of pairwise comparisons where each comparison is a weighted majority vote among the…

Autonomous software agents operating in dynamic environments need to constantly reason about actions in pursuit of their goals, while taking into consideration norms which might be imposed on those actions. Normative practical reasoning…

New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…

Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…

The host of a game presents two indistinguishable envelopes to an agent. One of the envelopes is randomly selected and allocated to the agent. The agent is informed that the monetary content of one of the envelopes is twice that of the…

We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate…

I study whether and which expert incentives can be provided at what cost when the states of the world become non-contractible, but there is some noisy observation about the states that can be contracted upon. A principal hires an agent to…