Related papers: Prudent Rationalizability and the Best Rationaliza…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
There is a common belief that humans and many animals follow transitive inference (choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C). Transitivity seems to be the essence of rational choice. We…
Human computation refers to the outsourcing of computation tasks to human workers. It offers a new direction for solving a variety of problems and calls for innovative ways of managing human computation processes. The majority of human…
In this paper the theory of flexibly-bounded rationality which is an extension to the theory of bounded rationality is revisited. Rational decision making involves using information which is almost always imperfect and incomplete together…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
We consider the problem of rational uncertainty about unproven mathematical statements, remarked on by G\"odel and others. Using Bayesian-inspired arguments we build a normative model of fair bets under deductive uncertainty which draws…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
When collaborating with an AI system, we need to assess when to trust its recommendations. If we mistakenly trust it in regions where it is likely to err, catastrophic failures may occur, hence the need for Bayesian approaches for…
Rational decision making in its linguistic description means making logical decisions. In essence, a rational agent optimally processes all relevant information to achieve its goal. Rationality has two elements and these are the use of…
We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
It has a long tradition to study trust behavior among humans or artificial agents by investigating the trust game. Although previous studies based on evolutionary game theory have revealed that trust and trustworthiness can be promoted if…
Traditional logic-based belief revision research focuses on designing rules to constrain the behavior of revision operators. Frameworks have been proposed to characterize iterated revision rules, but they are often too loose, leading to…
Real-life agents seldom have unlimited reasoning power. In this paper, we propose and study a new formal notion of computationally bounded strategic ability in multi-agent systems. The notion characterizes the ability of a set of agents to…
We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of…
Choice functions constitute a simple, direct and very general mathematical framework for modelling choice under uncertainty. In particular, they are able to represent the set-valued choices that typically arise from applying decision rules…
We explore several concepts for analyzing the intuitive notion of computational irreducibility and we propose a robust formal definition, first in the field of cellular automata and then in the general field of any computable function f…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Rationality has been an intriguing topic for several decades. Even the scope of definition of rationality across different subjects varies. Several theories (e.g., game theory) initially evolved on the basis that agents (e.g., humans) are…
We introduce a new paradigm for game theory -- Bayesian satisfaction. This novel approach is a synthesis of the idea of Bayesian rationality introduced by Aumann, and satisfaction games. The concept of Bayesian rationality for which, in…