Related papers: Solving Four Open Problems about Core Stability in…
In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
We consider the complexity of maximizing egalitarian welfare in Friends and Enemies Games -- a subclass of hedonic games in which every agent partitions other agents into friends and enemies. We investigate two classic scenarios proposed in…
A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…
We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…
Game theory is the mathematical framework for analyzing strategic interactions in conflict and competition situations. In recent years quantum game theory has earned the attention of physicists, and has emerged as a branch of quantum…
We conduct a computational analysis of fair and optimal partitions in additively separable hedonic games. We show that, for strict preferences, a Pareto optimal partition can be found in polynomial time while verifying whether a given…
We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. Considering the growing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions…
Getting a group to adopt cooperative norms is an enduring challenge. But in real-world settings, individuals don't just passively accept static environments, they act both within and upon the social systems that structure their…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
Coreness represents solution concepts related to core in cooperative games, which captures the stability of players. Motivated by the scale effect in social networks, economics and other scenario, we study the coreness of cooperative game…
We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the…
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…
We initiate the study of simple games from the point of view of combinatorial topology. The starting premise is that the losing coalitions of a simple game can be identified with a simplicial complex. Various topological constructions and…
We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…