Related papers: Utilitarian Guarantees for the Method of Equal Sha…
To make informed health policy decisions regarding a treatment, we must consider both its cost and its clinical effectiveness. In past work, we introduced the net benefit separation (NBS) as a novel measure of cost-effectiveness. The NBS is…
There is a lack of consensus within the literature as to how `fairness' of algorithmic systems can be measured, and different metrics can often be at odds. In this paper, we approach this task by drawing on the ethical frameworks of…
In many parts of the world - particularly in developing countries - the demand for electricity exceeds the available supply. In such cases, it is impossible to provide electricity to all households simultaneously. This raises a fundamental…
(Gradient) Expectation Maximization (EM) is a widely used algorithm for estimating the maximum likelihood of mixture models or incomplete data problems. A major challenge facing this popular technique is how to effectively preserve the…
Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human evaluation. We study this selection problem as a…
Algorithmic fairness has gained prominence due to societal and regulatory concerns about biases in Machine Learning models. Common group fairness metrics like Equalized Odds for classification or Demographic Parity for both classification…
Fair clustering has traditionally focused on ensuring equitable group representation or equalizing group-specific clustering costs. However, Dickerson et al. (2025) recently showed that these fairness notions may yield undesirable or…
We use decision theory to compare variants of differential privacy from the perspective of prospective study participants. We posit the existence of a preference ordering on the set of potential consequences that study participants can…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
In this note we consider a society that partitions itself into disjoint jurisdictions, each choosing a location of its public project and a taxation scheme to finance it. The set of public project is multi-dimensional, and their costs could…
Motivated by real-world applications, we study the fair allocation of graphical resources, where the resources are the vertices in a graph. Upon receiving a set of resources, an agent's utility equals the weight of a maximum matching in the…
Two prominent objectives in social choice are utilitarian - maximizing the sum of agents' utilities, and leximin - maximizing the smallest agent's utility, then the second-smallest, etc. Utilitarianism is typically computationally easier to…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…
Budget-feasible procurement auctions play a pivotal role in various AI-driven marketplaces, such as data acquisition and crowdsourcing, where a buyer with a limited budget seeks to procure services from strategic sellers with private costs.…
We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of $n$ voters specifies additive utilities over $m$ candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of projects (i.e., a committee) with total size at most…
The aim of this paper is to introduce models and algorithms for the Participatory Budgeting problem when projects can interact with each other. In this problem, the objective is to select a set of projects that fits in a given budget.…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of welfare measures when oligopolistic firms face multiple policy interventions and external changes under general forms of market demands, production costs, and imperfect competition. We present…
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…