Related papers: Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment

In this second article, we show a simple use of the Ignorance as defined in "Jaynes & Shannon's Constrained Ignorance and Surprise". By giving an example about the journey of a person, we believe to show some simple, obvious but…

This paper is concerned with the epistemic question of confirming a hypothesis -- the guilt of a defendant -- by way of testimony heard by a juror over the course of an American-style criminal trial. In it, I attempt to settle a dispute…

Reinforcement learning methods are increasingly used to optimise dialogue policies from experience. Most current techniques are model-free: they directly estimate the utility of various actions, without explicit model of the interaction…

A principal and $n\ge 2$ agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least $k$ agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unknown state. The principal can conduct a test to learn about…

We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. Voters may be "contingent" with…

We consider general Bayesian persuasion problems where the receiver's utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action. We show that a signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and that such pairwise…

It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more information is better, and that information should never be ignored. Here we argue, using both a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian analysis, that in some situations you are better off ignoring information…

It is commonly-accepted wisdom that more information is better, and that information should never be ignored. Here we argue, using both a Bayesian and a non-Bayesian analysis, that in some situations you are better off ignoring information…

In the absence of empirical confirmation, scientists may judge a theory's chances of being viable based on a wide range of arguments. The paper argues that such arguments can differ substantially with regard to their structural similarly to…

We propose a new method for conducting Bayesian prediction that delivers accurate predictions without correctly specifying the unknown true data generating process. A prior is defined over a class of plausible predictive models. After…

Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…

In this paper the problem of learning appropriate bias for an environment of related tasks is examined from a Bayesian perspective. The environment of related tasks is shown to be naturally modelled by the concept of an {\em objective}…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

Non-binding communication is common in daily life and crucial for fostering cooperation, even though it has no direct payoff consequences. However, despite robust empirical evidence, its evolutionary basis remains poorly understood. Here,…

An information cascade is a circumstance where agents make decisions in a sequential fashion by following other agents. Bikhchandani et al., predict that once a cascade starts it continues, even if it is wrong, until agents receive an…

This article introduces a Bayesian nonparametric method for quantifying the relative evidence in a dataset in favour of the dependence or independence of two variables conditional on a third. The approach uses Polya tree priors on spaces of…

Many resources for forensic scholars and practitioners, such as journal articles, guidance documents, and textbooks, address how to make a value of evidence assessment in the form of a likelihood ratio (LR) when deciding between two…

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver faces a sequential decision making (SDM) problem. At each…

We show that it can be suboptimal for Bayesian decision-making agents employing social learning to use correct prior probabilities as their initial beliefs. We consider sequential Bayesian binary hypothesis testing where each individual…

Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…