Related papers: Delegation and Lobbying
We study vote delegation with "well-behaving" and "misbehaving" agents and compare it with conventional voting. Typical examples for vote delegation are validation or governance tasks on blockchains. There is a majority of well-behaving…
Liquid democracy is a decision-making paradigm in which each agent can either vote directly for some alternative or (transitively) delegate its vote to another agent. To mitigate the issue of delegation cycles or the concentration of power,…
Liquid democracy is the principle of making collective decisions by letting agents transitively delegate their votes. Despite its significant appeal, it has become apparent that a weakness of liquid democracy is that a small subset of…
When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political…
This paper provides a formal model for the burden of persuasion in dialogues, and in particular, in legal proceedings. The model shows how an allocation of the burden of persuasion may induce single outcomes in dialectical contexts in…
We develop a simple theoretic game a model to analyze the relationship between electoral sys tems and governments' choice in trade policies. We show that existence of international pressure or foreign lobby changes a government's final…
We study a neuro-inspired model that mimics a discussion (or information dissemination) process in a network of agents. During their interaction, agents redistribute activity and network weights, resulting in emergence of leader(s). The…
Proponents of participatory democracy praise Liquid Democracy: decisions are taken by referendum, but voters delegate their votes freely. When better informed voters are present, delegation can increase the probability of a correct…
The advancement of generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), has a significant impact on politics and democracy, offering potential across various domains, including policymaking, political communication, analysis, and…
This paper models legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated and the agenda setter cannot…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
In this paper we extend some recent results on an operatorial approach to the description of alliances between political parties interacting among themselves and with a basin of electors. In particular, we propose and compare three…
A principal contracts with an agent through an informed delegate. Although the principal cannot directly mediate the interaction, she can restrict the menus of contracts the delegate may offer. We characterize the outcomes implementable…
What role do non-elected bureaucrats play when elections provide imperfect accountability and create incentives for pandering? We develop a model where politicians and bureaucrats interact to implement policy. Both can either be good,…
The dynamics of random transitive delegations on a graph are of particular interest when viewed through the lens of an emerging voting paradigm, liquid democracy. This paradigm allows voters to choose between directly voting and…
Disciplinary diversity is being recognized today as the key to establish a vibrant academic environment with bigger potential for breakthroughs in research and technology. However, the interaction of several factors including policies, and…
Coalition negotiations are a cornerstone of parliamentary democracies, characterised by complex interactions and strategic communications among political parties. Despite its significance, the modelling of these negotiations has remained…
We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is largely motivated by emerging blockchain governance systems, which include voters with…
We develop and apply epistemic tests to various decentralized governance methods as well as to study the impact of participation. These tests probe the ability to reach a correct outcome when there is one. We find that partial abstention is…
We develop a theory of distributive competition under redistricting that explains both electoral outcomes and the equilibrium allocation of policy benefits by endogenizing voter pivotality. In a multi-district model with primaries, general…