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This paper proposes a model to explain the potential role of inter-group conflicts in determining the rise and fall of signaling norms. Individuals in a population are characterized by high and low productivity types and they are matched in…
In real-life complex systems, individuals often encounter multiple social dilemmas that cannot be effectively captured using a single-game model. Furthermore, the environment and limited resources both play a crucial role in shaping…
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals…
In nature and human societies, the effects of homogeneous and heterogeneous characteristics on the evolution of collective behaviors are quite different from each other. It is of great importance to understand the underlying mechanisms of…
The evolutionary mechanisms of cooperative behavior represent a fundamental topic in complex systems and evolutionary dynamics. Real-world collective interactions, particularly in multi-agent systems, are often characterized by…
We are living in an uncertain and dynamically changing world, where optimal decision-making under uncertainty is directly linked to the survival of species. However, evolutionary selection pressures that shape value-based decision-making…
The contact structure of the population shapes the progression of epidemics. Nonetheless, the joint evolution of individual behavioral adaptations and disease dynamics on networks remains poorly understood. We use a…
We introduce heterogeneous R&D productivities into an endogenous R&D network formation model, generalizing the framework of Goyal and Moraga-Gonz\'alez (2001). Heterogeneous productivities endogenously create asymmetric gains from…
Games with environmental feedback have become a crucial area of study across various scientific domains, modelling the dynamic interplay between human decisions and environmental changes, and highlighting the consequences of our choices on…
The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving…
In the realm of evolutionary game theory, standard frameworks typically presuppose that every player possesses comprehensive knowledge and unrestricted access to the entire strategy space. However, real-world human society inherently…
Human decision behaviour is quite diverse. In many games humans on average do not achieve maximal payoff and the behaviour of individual players remains inhomogeneous even after playing many rounds. For instance, in repeated prisoner…
Understanding the emergence of prosocial behaviours among self-interested individuals is an important problem in many scientific disciplines. Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain the evolution of such behaviours, primarily…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
The ultimatum game has been a prominent paradigm in studying the evolution of fairness. It predicts that responders should accept any nonzero offer and proposers should offer the smallest possible amount according to orthodox game theory.…
Cooperative equilibria are fragile. When agents learn alongside each other rather than in a fixed environment, the process of learning destabilizes the cooperation they are trying to sustain: every gradient step an agent takes shifts the…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
A growing line of work reframes preference-based fine-tuning of large language models game-theoretically: Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) recasts the problem as a zero-sum game over policies. However, optimization is over expected…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or…