Related papers: A short way to the stability
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
This two-part paper proposes a compositional and equilibrium-free approach to analyzing power system stability. In Part I, we have established the stability theory and proposed stability conditions based on the delta dissipativity. In Part…
An unconventional approach for optimal stopping under model ambiguity is introduced. Besides ambiguity itself, we take into account how ambiguity-averse an agent is. This inclusion of ambiguity attitude, via an $\alpha$-maxmin nonlinear…
This paper proposes a methodology to stabilize relative equilibria in a model of identical, steered particles moving in three-dimensional Euclidean space. Exploiting the Lie group structure of the resulting dynamical system, the…
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…
Generalizing a variety of earlier problems on stable contracts in two-sided markets, Alkan and Gale introduced in 2003 a general stability model on a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the vertices are interpreted as ``agents'', and the…
Self-stabilization is a versatile technique to withstand any transient fault in a distributed system. Mobile robots (or agents) are one of the emerging trends in distributed computing as they mimic autonomous biologic entities. The…
In the present paper a model of a market consisting of real and financial interacting sectors is studied. Agents populating the stock market are assumed to be not able to observe the true underlying fundamental, and their beliefs are biased…
This paper deals with two-sided matching market with two disjoint sets, i.e. the set of buyers and the set of sellers. Each seller can trade with at most with one buyer and vice versa. Money is transferred from sellers to buyers for an…
Transient stability is crucial to the reliable operation of power systems. Existing theories rely on the simplified electromechanical models, substituting the detailed electromagnetic dynamics of inductor and capacitor with their impedance…
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph $G=(N,E)$, with an integer vertex capacity function $b$ and an edge weighting $w$. The set $N$ consists of a number of…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where…
Determination of stability and instability of singular points in nonlinear dynamical systems is an important issue that has attracted considerable attention in different fields of engineering and science. So far, different well-defined…
We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…
Recent advancements in bipartite consensus, a scenario where agents are divided into two disjoint sets with agents in the same set agreeing on a certain value and those in different sets agreeing on opposite or specifically related values,…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…