Related papers: Totally mixed conditional independence equilibria …
An $n$-player game $X$ in normal form can be modeled via undirected discrete graphical models where the discrete random variables represent the players and their state spaces are the set of pure strategies. There exists an edge between the…
This paper is a significant step forward in understanding dependency equilibria within the framework of real algebraic geometry encompassing both pure and mixed equilibria. In alignment with Spohn's original definition of dependency…
We study the Spohn conditional independence (CI) variety $C_X$ of an $n$-player game $X$ for undirected graphical models on $n$ binary random variables consisting of one edge. For a generic game, we show that $C_X$ is a smooth irreducible…
We present a unified framework for characterizing local Nash equilibria in continuous games on either infinite-dimensional or finite-dimensional non-convex strategy spaces. We provide intrinsic necessary and sufficient first- and…
This paper introduces a unified framework called cooperative extensive form games, which (i) generalizes standard non-cooperative games, and (ii) allows for more complex coalition formation dynamics than previous concepts like…
An $n$-person game is specified by $n$ tensors of the same format. We view its equilibria as points in that tensor space. Dependency equilibria are defined by linear constraints on conditional probabilities, and thus by determinantal…
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…
We compute a parametric description of the totally mixed Nash equilibria of a generic game in normal form with pre-fixed structure. Using this representation, we show conditions under which a game has the maximum possible number of this…
We use vector bundles to study the locus of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $n$-player game in normal form, which we call the Nash equilibrium scheme. When the payoff tensor format is balanced, we study the Nash discriminant variety,…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We present a computational formulation for the approximate version of several variational inequality problems, investigating their computational complexity and establishing PPAD-completeness. Examining applications in computational game…
This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…
Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in…
It is known that the set of all correlated equilibria of an n-player non-cooperative game is a convex polytope and includes all the Nash equilibria. Further, the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of this polytope. We study the…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
In this note, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon linear-quadratic difference games with coupled affine inequality constraints involving both state and control variables. We show that the necessary conditions for the existence…