Related papers: Computing Equilibrium Nominations in Presidential …
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
This paper considers elections in which voters choose one candidate each, independently according to known probability distributions. A candidate receiving a strict majority (absolute or relative, depending on the version) wins. After the…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
The median-voter hypothesis (MVH) predicts convergence of two party platforms across a one-dimensional political spectrum during majoritarian elections. From the viewpoint of the MVH, an explanation of polarization is that each election has…
Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Motivated by the hope of developing group…
We use Hotelling's spatial model of competition to investigate the position-taking behaviour of political candidates under a class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. In a scoring rule election, voters rank all the candidates…
Consider an important meeting to be held in a team-based organization. Taking availability constraints into account, an online scheduling poll is being used in order to decide upon the exact time of the meeting. Decisions are to be taken…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
Given a set of agents with approval preferences over each other, we study the task of finding $k$ matchings fairly representing everyone's preferences. We model the problem as an approval-based multiwinner election where the set of…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers…
We study the impact of strategic behavior in labor markets characterized by algorithmic monoculture, where firms compete for a shared pool of applicants using a common algorithmic evaluation. In this setting, "naive" hiring strategies lead…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…
Election rules are formal processes that aggregate voters preferences, typically to select a single candidate, called the winner. Most of the election rules studied in the literature require the voters to rank the candidates from the most…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
The search problem of computing a \textit{leader-follower equilibrium} has been widely investigated in the scientific literature in, almost exclusively, the single-follower setting. Although the \textit{optimistic} and \ textit{pessimistic}…