Related papers: Robust Resource Allocation via Competitive Subsidi…
This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…
The Competition Complexity of an auction measures how much competition is needed for the revenue of a simple auction to surpass the optimal revenue. A classic result from auction theory by Bulow and Klemperer [9], states that the…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
Algorithmic recourse aims to disclose the inner workings of the black-box decision process in situations where decisions have significant consequences, by providing recommendations to empower beneficiaries to achieve a more favorable…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
In this paper, we study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to bid adaptively in repeated first-price auctions to maximize cumulative payoff. This problem arises from the recent industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to…
Dynamic pricing is commonly used to regulate congestion in shared service systems. This paper is motivated by the fact that in the presence of users with varying price sensitivity (responsiveness), conventional monotonic pricing can lead to…
Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing…
We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…
We study the robust double auction mechanisms, that is, the double auction mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality and ex-post budget balance. We first establish that the price in…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
We study an online fair division setting, where goods arrive one at a time and there is a fixed set of $n$ agents, each of whom has an additive valuation function over the goods. Once a good appears, the value each agent has for it is…
We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can use to obtain resources; leftover tokens are worthless. We…
A Latin square is an $n \times n$ matrix filled with $n$ distinct symbols, each of which appears exactly once in each row and exactly once in each column. We introduce a problem of allocating $n$ indivisible items among $n$ agents over $n$…
Inspired by online ad allocation, we study online stochastic packing linear programs from theoretical and practical standpoints. We first present a near-optimal online algorithm for a general class of packing linear programs which model…
Motivated by practical constraints in online advertising, we investigate single-parameter auction design for bidders with constraints on their Return On Investment (ROI) -- a targeted minimum ratio between the obtained value and the…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…
The following game is played on a weighted graph: Alice selects a matching $M$ and Bob selects a number $k$. Alice's payoff is the ratio of the weight of the $k$ heaviest edges of $M$ to the maximum weight of a matching of size at most $k$.…
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…