Related papers: Evolving Rules: Imitation and Best Response Learni…
Evolutionary game theory classically investigates which behavioral patterns are evolutionarily successful in a single game. More recently, a number of contributions have studied the evolution of preferences instead: which subjective…
This article introduces an imitation learning method for learning maximum entropy policies that comply with constraints demonstrated by expert trajectories executing a task. The formulation of the method takes advantage of results…
We study selection acting on phenotype in a collection of agents playing local games lacking Nash equilibria. After each cycle one of the agents losing most games is replaced by a new agent with new random strategy and game partner. The…
This paper demonstrates the quantization of a spatial Cournot duopoly model with product choice, a two stage game focusing on non-cooperation in locations and quantities. With quantization, the players can access a continuous set of…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
We propose a consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game. In our model, both of the two connected agents receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost. Agents update their opinions by comparing…
We consider a model of learning and evolution in games whose action sets are endowed with a partition-based similarity structure intended to capture exogenous similarities between strategies. In this model, revising agents have a higher…
We formulate and study a general time-varying multi-agent system where players repeatedly compete under incomplete information. Our work is motivated by scenarios commonly observed in online advertising and retail marketplaces, where agents…
A major problem in evolutionary biology is how species learn and adapt under the constraint of environmental conditions and competition of other species. Models of cyclic dominance provide simplified settings in which such questions can be…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
The long-term impact of algorithmic decision making is shaped by the dynamics between the deployed decision rule and individuals' response. Focusing on settings where each individual desires a positive classification---including many…
We develop estimation and inference methods for a stylized macroeconomic model with potentially multiple behavioural equilibria, where agents form expectations using a constant-gain learning rule. We first show geometric ergodicity of the…
During social interactions, groups develop collective competencies that (ideally) should assist groups to outperform average standalone individual members (weak cognitive synergy) or the best performing member in the group (strong cognitive…
A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement…
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will…
We study an independent best-response dynamics on network games in which the nodes (players) decide to revise their strategies independently with some probability. We provide several bounds on the convergence time to an equilibrium as a…
Models of adaptive bet-hedging commonly adopt insights from Kelly's famous work on optimal gambling strategies and the financial value of information. In particular, such models seek evolutionary solutions that maximize long term average…
We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who…
In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \emph{Hannan consistency}, or \emph{no-regret}. However, the…