Related papers: Formal Verification of Diffusion Auctions

Motivated by applications to word-of-mouth advertising, we consider a game-theoretic scenario in which competing advertisers want to target initial adopters in a social network. Each advertiser wishes to maximize the resulting cascade of…

We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state,…

Auctions are key for maximizing sellers' revenue and ensuring truthful bidding among buyers. Recently, an approach known as differentiable economics based on machine learning (ML) has shown promise in learning powerful auction mechanisms…

Positional reasoning is the process of ordering unsorted parts contained in a set into a consistent structure. We present Positional Diffusion, a plug-and-play graph formulation with Diffusion Probabilistic Models to address positional…

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly correlated) joint distribution. We show that when the values and…

We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents, and the…

This paper develops the theory of mechanism redesign by which an auctioneer can reoptimize an auction based on bid data collected from previous iterations of the auction on bidders from the same market. We give a direct method for…

Many real-world scenarios require the random selection of one or more individuals from a pool of eligible candidates. One example of especial social relevance refers to the legal system, in which the jurors and judges are commonly picked…

We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a…

The division of goods in the online realm poses opportunities and challenges. While innovative mechanisms can be developed, uncertainty about the future may hinder effective solutions. This project aims to explore fair distribution models…

A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…

We propose a technique to detect and generate patterns in a network of locally interacting dynamical systems. Central to our approach is a novel spatial superposition logic, whose semantics is defined over the quad-tree of a partitioned…

Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishonest…

We derive valuations of a portfolio of financial instruments from a securities lending perspective, under different assumptions, and show a weighting scheme that converges to the true valuation. We illustrate conditions under which our…

The convergence properties of learning dynamics in repeated auctions is a timely and important question, with numerous applications in, e.g., online advertising markets. This work focuses on repeated first-price auctions where bidders with…

We introduce the study of designing allocation mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods in settings with interdependent valuation functions. In our setting, there is a set of goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents…

Formal verification of multi-agent systems is hard, both theoretically and in practice. In particular, studies that use a single verification technique typically show limited efficiency, and allow to verify only toy examples. Here, we…

Machine learning algorithms for prediction are increasingly being used in critical decisions affecting human lives. Various fairness formalizations, with no firm consensus yet, are employed to prevent such algorithms from systematically…

In a crowdsourcing contest, a principal holding a task posts it to a crowd. People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via social…

This paper studies mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets, a novel setting where the budgets that bidders commit are adjusted due to the externality of the competitors' allocation outcomes-a departure from traditional…