Related papers: Classification in Equilibrium: Structure of Optima…
We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the…
We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…
Incentives in experimental design are often misaligned: experimenters design and finance experiments to seek regulatory approval, while regulators seek to maximize social-welfare. We propose a framework to resolve this conflict, wherein…
Classification algorithms based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) are nowadays applied in high-stakes decisions in finance, healthcare, criminal justice, or education. Individuals can strategically adapt to the information gathered about…
Among the major difficulties that one may encounter when estimating parameters in a nonlinear regression model are the nonuniqueness of the estimator, its instability with respect to small perturbations of the observations and the presence…
Oscillations often take place in populations of decision makers that are either a coordinator, who takes action only if enough others do so, or an anticoordinator, who takes action only if few others do so. Populations consisting of…
Recent works have proposed optimal subsampling algorithms to improve computational efficiency in large datasets and to design validation studies in the presence of measurement error. Existing approaches generally fall into two categories:…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…
The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…
While evolutionary algorithms are known to be very successful for a broad range of applications, the algorithm designer is often left with many algorithmic choices, for example, the size of the population, the mutation rates, and the…
In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all…
We consider the problem of constructing optimal designs for model discrimination between competing regression models. Various new properties of optimal designs with respect to the popular $T$-optimality criterion are derived, which in many…
The emergence of powerful LLMs has led to a paradigm shift in Natural Language Understanding and Natural Language Generation. The properties that make LLMs so valuable for these tasks -- creativity, ability to produce fluent speech, and…
We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…
The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked…
Given a set of items and a set of evaluators who all individually rank them, how do we aggregate these evaluations into a single societal ranking? Work in social choice and statistics has produced many aggregation methods for this problem,…
Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or…
Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…