Related papers: EASE: Practical and Efficient Safety Alignment for…
Large language models (LLMs), despite possessing latent safety understanding from their vast pretraining data, remain vulnerable to generating harmful content and exhibit issues such as over-refusal and utility degradation after safety…
Safety alignment is an essential research topic for real-world AI applications. Despite the multifaceted nature of safety and trustworthiness in AI, current safety alignment methods often focus on a comprehensive notion of safety. By…
As large-scale language models increasingly impact safety-critical domains, ensuring their reliable adherence to well-defined principles remains a fundamental challenge. We introduce Deliberative Alignment, a new paradigm that directly…
Large language models (LLMs), despite being safety-aligned, exhibit brittle refusal behaviors that can be circumvented by simple linguistic changes. As tense jailbreaking demonstrates that models refusing harmful requests often comply when…
Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked widespread concerns about their safety. Recent work demonstrates that safety alignment of LLMs can be easily removed by fine-tuning with a few adversarially chosen…
Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle with complex reasoning due to limited diversity and inefficient search. We propose Soft Reasoning, an embedding-based search framework that optimises the embedding of the first token to guide…
When performing reasoning tasks with user-specific requirements, such as strict output formats, large language models (LLMs) often prioritize reasoning over adherence to detailed instructions. Fine-tuning LLMs on supervised datasets to…
Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) language models introduce unique challenges for safety alignment due to their sparse routing mechanisms, which can enable degenerate optimization behaviors under standard full-parameter fine-tuning. In our…
Large language models (LLMs) have a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines including biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research…
Jailbreaking -- bypassing built-in safety mechanisms in AI models -- has traditionally required complex technical procedures or specialized human expertise. In this study, we show that the persuasive capabilities of large reasoning models…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where…
Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have serious security vulnerabilities.While safety alignment using multimodal datasets consisting of text and data of additional modalities can effectively enhance MLLM's security, it is costly to…
While reasoning models have achieved remarkable success in complex reasoning tasks, their increasing power necessitates stringent safety measures. For safety alignment, the core challenge lies in the inherent trade-off between safety and…
Large Language Model ensembles improve reasoning accuracy, but only up to a performance boundary beyond which additional deliberation degrades accuracy. We introduce DASE (Deliberative Adaptive Stopping Ensemble), a stopping heuristic for…
Recent studies show that Large Language Models (LLMs) with safety alignment can be jail-broken by fine-tuning on a dataset mixed with harmful data. First time in the literature, we show that the jail-broken effect can be mitigated by…
While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in recent advancements, their susceptibility to jailbreak attacks has come to light. In such attacks, adversaries exploit carefully crafted prompts to coerce…
We introduce \emph{self-jailbreaking}, a threat model in which an aligned LLM guides its own compromise. Unlike most jailbreak techniques, which often rely on handcrafted prompts or separate attacker models, self-jailbreaking requires no…
Mechanistic interpretability reveals that safety-critical behaviors (e.g., alignment, jailbreak, backdoor) in Large Language Models (LLMs) are grounded in specialized functional components. However, existing safety attribution methods…
Safety alignment has become a critical step to ensure LLMs refuse harmful requests while providing helpful and harmless responses. However, despite the ubiquity of safety alignment for deployed frontier models, two separate lines of recent…
With the widespread deployment of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) for visual-reasoning tasks, improving their safety has become crucial. Recent research indicates that despite training-time safety alignment, these models remain…