Related papers: Competitive optimal portfolio selection under mean…
We study learning dynamics induced by strategic agents who repeatedly play a game with an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In this dynamics, a belief estimate of the parameter is repeatedly updated given players' strategies and realized…
We consider existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in an $N$-player game of utility maximization under relative performance criteria of multiplicative form in complete semimartingale markets. For a large class of players' utility…
The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…
We leverage best response dynamics to solve monotone variational inequalities on compact and convex sets. Specialization of the method to variational inequalities in game theory recovers convergence results to Nash equilibria when agents…
This paper focuses on multi-agent stochastic differential games for jump-diffusion systems. On one hand, we study the multi-agent game for optimal investment in a jump-diffusion market. We derive constant Nash equilibria and provide…
We study time-inconsistent recursive stochastic control problems, i.e., for which the Bellman principle of optimality does not hold. For this class of problems classical optimal controls may fail to exist, or to be relevant in practice, and…
Building on the macroscopic market making framework as a control problem, this paper investigates its extension to stochastic games. In the context of price competition, each agent is benchmarked against the best quote offered by the…
Entities in multi-agent systems may seek conflicting subobjectives, and this leads to competition between them. To address performance degradation due to competition, we consider a bi-level lottery where a social planner at the high level…
The paper [12] examines a concept of equilibrium policies instead of optimal controls in stochastic optimization to analyze a mean-variance portfolio selection problem. We follow the same approach in order to investigate the Merton…
In this paper, we study the mean-variance portfolio selection problem under partial information with drift uncertainty. First we show that the market model is complete even in this case while the information is not complete and the drift is…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for time-varying and location-specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activity. This model…
This paper builds on the work of Degond, Herty and Liu by considering N-player stochastic differential games. The control corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of such a game is approximated through model predictive control (MPC) techniques.…
Game theory finds nowadays a broad range of applications in engineering and machine learning. However, in a derivative-free, expensive black-box context, very few algorithmic solutions are available to find game equilibria. Here, we propose…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…
In stochastic dynamic games, when the number of players is sufficiently large and the interactions between agents depend on empirical state distribution, one way to approximate the original game is to introduce infinite-population limit of…