Related papers: Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for…

In this paper, we introduce the third party to achieve the Stackelberg equilibrium with the time inconsistency in three different Stackelberg games, which are the discrete-time games, the dynamic games, and the mean field games. Here all…

We introduce and study the axiom of null player neutrality in the context of cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games). This axiom weakens the classical coalitional strategic equivalence: rather than requiring that augmenting a…

In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…

In spite of increased attention on explainable machine learning models, explaining multi-output predictions has not yet been extensively addressed. Methods that use Shapley values to attribute feature contributions to the decision making…

In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money…

We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the…

Suppose that $n$ computer devices are to be connected to a network via inhomogeneous Bernoulli trials. The Shapley value of a device quantifies how much the network's value increases due to the participation of that device. Characteristic…

Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

Shapley value is originally a concept in econometrics to fairly distribute both gains and costs to players in a coalition game. In the recent decades, its application has been extended to other areas such as marketing, engineering and…

Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…

Additive feature explanations using Shapley values have become popular for providing transparency into the relative importance of each feature to an individual prediction of a machine learning model. While Shapley values provide a unique…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

In this paper we study mean field games with possibly multiple mean field equilibria. Instead of focusing on the individual equilibria, we propose to study the set of values over all possible equilibria, which we call the set value of the…

Two straightforward methods to extend an assessment of individual elements to groups are to sum individual assessments or to treat the group as a single merged element and assess it accordingly. In this work, we analyze another natural…

Many emerging problems involve teams of agents taking part in a game. Such problems require a stochastic analysis with regard to the correlation structures among the agents belonging to a given team. In the context of Standard Borel spaces,…

Feature-based SPL analysis and family-based model checking have seen rapid development. Many model checking problems can be reduced to two-player games on finite graphs. A prominent example is mu-calculus model checking, which is generally…

This paper is devoted to Nash equilibrium for games in capacities. Such games with payoff expressed by Choquet integral were considered by Kozhan and Zarichnyi (Nash equilibria for games in capacities, Econ. Theory {\bf 35} (2008) 321--331)…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

We consider two player quadratic games in a cooperative framework known as social value orientation, motivated by the need to account for complex interactions between humans and autonomous agents in dynamical systems. Social value…