Related papers: Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for…
We analyse an algorithm solving stochastic mean-payoff games, combining the ideas of relative value iteration and of Krasnoselskii-Mann damping. We derive parameterized complexity bounds for several classes of games satisfying…
Connections are made between solution concepts for games in characteristic function form and Euler's Theorem underlying the neo-classical theory of distribution in which the total output produced is imputed to the marginal products of the…
The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1971), is a classic model for two-sided matching markets between buyers and sellers. In the original assignment game, it is assumed that payments lead to transferable utility and that…
This study proposes a novel solution concept--the w-value--for cooperative games with public externalities. The w-value is axiomatically founded on three principles: Pareto Optimality (PO), Market Equilibrium (ME), and Fiscal Balance (FB),…
The complex nature of artificial neural networks raises concerns on their reliability, trustworthiness, and fairness in real-world scenarios. The Shapley value -- a solution concept from game theory -- is one of the most popular explanation…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
The attribution problem, that is the problem of attributing a model's prediction to its base features, is well-studied. We extend the notion of attribution to also apply to feature interactions. The Shapley value is a commonly used method…
Attribution scores can be applied in data management to quantify the contribution of individual items to conclusions from the data, as part of the explanation of what led to these conclusions. In Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,…
Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that…
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
The Shapley value provides a principled framework for fairly distributing rewards among participants according to their individual contributions. While prior work has applied this concept to data valuation in machine learning, existing…
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in…
Shapley value is a popular approach for measuring the influence of individual features. While Shapley feature attribution is built upon desiderata from game theory, some of its constraints may be less natural in certain machine learning…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
Collaborative machine learning enables multiple data owners to jointly train models for improved predictive performance. However, ensuring incentive compatibility and fair contribution-based rewards remains a critical challenge. Prior work…
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…
Cooperative game theory methods, notably Shapley values, have significantly enhanced machine learning (ML) interpretability. However, existing explainable AI (XAI) frameworks mainly attribute average model predictions, overlooking…
This paper studies partially observable two-person zero-sum semi-Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the system state may not be completely observed. It focuses on the probability that the accumulated rewards of player 1…
We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call $\varepsilon$-estimated equilibrium and prove its…