Related papers: Mechanism Design with Information Leakage
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
We consider the information design problem in spatial resource competition settings. Agents gather at a location deciding whether to move to another location for possibly higher level of resources, and the utility each agent gets by moving…
In the standard formulation of mechanism design, a key assumption is that the designer has reliable information and technology to determine a prior distribution on types of the agents. In the meanwhile, as pointed out by the Wilson's…
An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this…
We provide the first analysis of (deferred acceptance) clock auctions in the learning-augmented framework. These auctions satisfy a unique list of appealing properties, including obvious strategyproofness, transparency, and unconditional…
An auction house cannot generally provide the optimal auction technology to every client. Instead it provides one or several auction technologies, and clients select the most appropriate one. For example, eBay provides ascending auctions…
We study equilibrium investment into bidding and latency reduction for different sequencing policies. For a batch auction design, we observe that bidders shade bids according to the likelihood that competing bidders land in the current…
We propose an operational measure of information leakage in a non-stochastic setting to formalize privacy against a brute-force guessing adversary. We use uncertain variables, non-probabilistic counterparts of random variables, to construct…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…
In a unified framework we study equilibrium in the presence of an insider having information on the signal of the firm value, which is naturally connected to the fundamental price of the firm related asset. The fundamental value itself is…
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common economic situations, and yet it has not been studied, to our…
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
Differential privacy is a notion of privacy that has become very popular in the database community. Roughly, the idea is that a randomized query mechanism provides sufficient privacy protection if the ratio between the probabilities that…
In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the adversary typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically…
Opacity is an information flow property characterizing whether a system reveals its secret to an intruder. Verification of opacity for discrete-event systems modeled by automata is in general a hard problem. We discuss the question whether…
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each…
We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings where selfish agents generate online events. Previous work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an auction settings.…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for…