Related papers: Subjective inference
There are three principle paradigms of statistical inference: (i) Bayesian, (ii) information-based and (iii) frequentist inference. We describe an objective prior (the weighting or $w$-prior) which unifies objective Bayes and…
Bayesian methods are increasingly applied in these days in the theory and practice of statistics. Any Bayesian inference depends on a likelihood and a prior. Ideally one would like to elicit a prior from related sources of information or…
Behavioural economics provides labels for patterns in human economic behaviour. Probability weighting is one such label. It expresses a mismatch between probabilities used in a formal model of a decision (i.e. model parameters) and…
Bayesian inference typically relies on specifying a parametric model that approximates the data-generating process. However, misspecified models can yield poor convergence rates and unreliable posterior calibration. Bayesian empirical…
Inspired by empirical work in neuroscience for Bayesian approaches to brain function, we give a unified probabilistic account of various types of symbolic reasoning from data. We characterise them in terms of formal logic using the…
Bayesian inference provides a flexible way of combining data with prior information. However, quantile regression is not equipped with a parametric likelihood, and therefore, Bayesian inference for quantile regression demands careful…
Given two measurable spaces $H$ and $D$ with countably generated $\sigma$-algebras, a perfect prior probability measure $P_H$ on $H$ and a sampling distribution $S: H \rightarrow D$, there is a corresponding inference map $I: D \rightarrow…
The idea that the brain is a probabilistic (Bayesian) inference machine, continuously trying to figure out the hidden causes of its inputs, has become very influential in cognitive (neuro)science over recent decades. Here I present a…
After Bayes, the oldest Bayesian account of enumerative induction is given by Laplace's so-called rule of succession: if all $n$ observed instances of a phenomenon to date exhibit a given character, the probability that the next instance of…
The problem of forecasting conditional probabilities of the next event given the past is considered in a general probabilistic setting. Given an arbitrary (large, uncountable) set C of predictors, we would like to construct a single…
We study how much data a Bayesian observer needs to correctly infer the relative likelihoods of two events when both events are arbitrarily rare. Each period, either a blue die or a red die is tossed. The two dice land on side $1$ with…
We consider a decision maker who is unaware of objects to be sampled and thus cannot form beliefs about the occurrence of particular objects. Ex ante she can form beliefs about the occurrence of novelty and the frequencies of yet to be…
How should social scientists understand and communicate the uncertainty of statistically estimated causal effects? I propose we utilize the posterior distribution of a causal effect and present the probability of the effect being greater…
To make informed decisions in natural environments that change over time, humans must update their beliefs as new observations are gathered. Studies exploring human inference as a dynamical process that unfolds in time have focused on…
Recently, several researchers have claimed that conclusions obtained from a Bayes factor (or the posterior odds) may contradict those obtained from Bayesian posterior estimation. In this short paper, we wish to point out that no such…
We revisit and generalize the concept of composite likelihood as a method to make a probabilistic inference by aggregation of multiple Bayesian agents, thereby defining a class of predictive models which we call composite Bayesian. This…
In order to improve forecasts, a decisionmaker often combines probabilities given by various sources, such as human experts and machine learning classifiers. When few training data are available, aggregation can be improved by incorporating…
One of the most fundamental problems in causal inference is the estimation of a causal effect when variables are confounded. This is difficult in an observational study, because one has no direct evidence that all confounders have been…
Ambiguity-averse decision makers typically dislike not only the presence of ambiguous events but also their increase, contrary to what standard ambiguity models predict. We axiomatically study such a decision maker. She avoids ex ante…
We present a Bayesian approach to predict the clustering of opinions for a system of interacting agents from partial observations. The Bayesian formulation overcomes the unobservability of the system and quantifies the uncertainty in the…