Related papers: Fair Indivisible Payoffs through Shapley Value
Ride-sharing services are gaining popularity and are crucial for a sustainable environment. A special case in which such services are most applicable, is the last mile variant. In this variant it is assumed that all the passengers are…
Collaborative machine learning (ML) is an appealing paradigm to build high-quality ML models by training on the aggregated data from many parties. However, these parties are only willing to share their data when given enough incentives,…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
We consider the problem of how to determine a fair source coding rate allocation method for the lossless data compression problem in multiterminal networks, e.g, the wireless sensor network where there are a large number of sources to be…
The Shapley value is a common tool in game theory to evaluate the importance of a player in a cooperative setting. In a geometric context, it provides a way to measure the contribution of a geometric object in a set towards some function on…
In this paper, we study the total displacement statistic of parking functions from the perspective of cooperative game theory. We introduce parking games, which are coalitional cost-sharing games in characteristic function form derived from…
Shapley value is a classic notion from game theory, historically used to quantify the contributions of individuals within groups, and more recently applied to assign values to data points when training machine learning models. Despite its…
Lloyd Shapley's cooperative value allocation theory stands as a central concept in game theory, extensively utilized across various domains to distribute resources, evaluate individual contributions, and ensure fairness. The Shapley value…
Various peer-to-peer energy markets have emerged in recent years in an attempt to manage distributed energy resources in a more efficient way. One of the main challenges these models face is how to create and allocate incentives to…
We introduce a new allocation rule, the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), for cooperative games whose characteristic function is incomplete. The UD-value assigns payoffs by distributing the total surplus of each family of indistinguishable…
We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…
"How much is my data worth?" is an increasingly common question posed by organizations and individuals alike. An answer to this question could allow, for instance, fairly distributing profits among multiple data contributors and determining…
What is the value of an individual model in an ensemble of binary classifiers? We answer this question by introducing a class of transferable utility cooperative games called \textit{ensemble games}. In machine learning ensembles,…
Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
In the classical context, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value has been adapted for post hoc explanations of machine learning models. However, this approach does not easily translate to eXplainable Quantum ML (XQML).…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…
Electing a committee of size k from m alternatives (k < m) is an interesting problem under the multi-winner voting rules. However, very few committee selection rules found in the literature consider the coalitional possibilities among the…
As the decisions made or influenced by machine learning models increasingly impact our lives, it is crucial to detect, understand, and mitigate unfairness. But even simply determining what "unfairness" should mean in a given context is…