Related papers: Strategic Learning with Asymmetric Rationality

We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system jointly controlled by a designer and one or more agents, where the designer can influence the agents' actions through selective information disclosure. At each time step, the…

Social learning, copying other's behavior without actual experience, offers a cost-effective means of knowledge acquisition. However, it raises the fundamental question of which individuals have reliable information: successful individuals…

This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the current status and opportunities for Large Language Models (LLMs) in strategic reasoning, a sophisticated form of reasoning that necessitates understanding and predicting adversary actions…

This paper considers the security investment problem over a network in which the resource owners aim to allocate their constrained security resources to heterogeneous targets strategically. Investing in each target makes it less vulnerable,…

We study data-driven learning of robust stochastic control for infinite-horizon systems with potentially continuous state and action spaces. In many managerial settings--supply chains, finance, manufacturing, services, and dynamic…

Models of economic decision makers often include idealized assumptions, such as rationality, perfect foresight, and access to all relevant pieces of information. These assumptions often assure the models' internal validity, but, at the same…

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…

This paper presents a social learning model where the network structure is endogenously determined by signal precision and dimension choices. Agents not only choose the precision of their signals and what dimension of the state to learn…

In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…

Learning how to learn efficiently is a fundamental challenge for biological agents and a growing concern for artificial ones. To learn effectively, an agent must regulate its learning speed, balancing the benefits of rapid improvement…

We develop a novel framework for costly information acquisition in which a decision-maker learns about an unobserved state by choosing a signal distribution, with the cost of information determined by the distribution of noise in the…

This paper proposes models of learning process in teams of individuals who collectively execute a sequence of tasks and whose actions are determined by individual skill levels and networks of interpersonal appraisals and influence. The…

In the classical secretary problem, one attempts to find the maximum of an unknown and unlearnable distribution through sequential search. In many real-world searches, however, distributions are not entirely unknown and can be learned…

Communication structure plays a key role in the learning capability of decentralized systems. Structural self-adaptation, by means of self-organization, changes the order as well as the input information of the agents' collective…

For a binary choice problem, the spatial coordination of decisions in an agent community is investigated both analytically and by means of stochastic computer simulations. The individual decisions are based on different local information…

An agent has access to multiple information sources, each of which provides information about a different attribute of an unknown state. Information is acquired continuously -- where the agent chooses both which sources to sample from, and…

We consider the problem of communication over a network containing a hidden and malicious adversary that can control a subset of network resources, and aims to disrupt communications. We focus on omniscient node-based adversaries, i.e., the…

This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…

We study a sequential social learning model in which there is uncertainty about the informativeness of a common signal-generating process. Rational agents arrive in order and make decisions based on the past actions of others and their…

The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…