Related papers: Impartial Selection with Predictions
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of the agents, the axiom of impartiality requires that the…
We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations…
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…
In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size $k$ among a group of $n$ is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of…
Impartial selection is the selection of an individual from a group based on nominations by other members of the group, in such a way that individuals cannot influence their own chance of selection. For this problem, we give a deterministic…
We examine strategy-proof elections to select a winner amongst a set of agents, each of whom cares only about winning. This impartial selection problem was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin and Alon et al. Fisher and Klimm…
We give new bounds for the single-nomination model of impartial selection, a problem proposed by Holzman and Moulin (Econometrica, 2013). A selection mechanism, which may be randomized, selects one individual from a group of $n$ based on…
In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being…
We study the problem of {\em impartial selection}, a topic that lies at the intersection of computational social choice and mechanism design. The goal is to select the most popular individual among a set of community members. The input can…
In this study, we examined the impact of recommendation systems' algorithms on individuals' collaborator choices when forming teams. Different algorithmic designs can lead individuals to select one collaborator over another, thereby shaping…
We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires \emph{multiple} agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a…
Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality,…
Selecting influentials in networks against strategic manipulations has attracted many researchers' attention and it also has many practical applications. Here, we aim to select one or two influentials in terms of progeny (the influential…
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…
Alignment research focuses on making individual AI systems reliable. Human institutions achieve reliable collective behaviour differently: they mitigate the risk posed by misaligned individuals through organisational structure. Multi-agent…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
When selecting multiple candidates based on approval preferences of agents, the proportional representation of agents' opinions is an important and well-studied desideratum. Existing criteria for evaluating the representativeness of…
Quota-based fairness mechanisms like the so-called Rooney rule or four-fifths rule are used in selection problems such as hiring or college admission to reduce inequalities based on sensitive demographic attributes. These mechanisms are…
We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent…