Related papers: On Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Abstention
A decision maker starts from a judgmental decision and moves to the closest boundary of the confidence interval. This statistical decision rule is admissible and does not perform worse than the judgmental decision with a probability equal…
In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but…
We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collectively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive…
Consider a set $V$ of voters, represented by a multiset in a metric space $(X,d)$. The voters have to reach a decision -- a point in $X$. A choice $p\in X$ is called a $\beta$-plurality point for $V$, if for any other choice $q\in X$ it…
In light of the classic impossibility results of Arrow and Gibbard and Satterthwaite regarding voting with ordinal rules, there has been recent interest in characterizing how well common voting rules approximate the social optimum. In order…
We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members'…
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For…
In the theory of voting, the Plurality rule for preferences that come in the form of linear orders selects the alternatives most frequently appearing in the first position of those orders, while the Anti-Plurality rule selects the…
The metric distortion framework posits that n voters and m candidates are jointly embedded in a metric space such that voters rank candidates that are closer to them higher. A voting rule's purpose is to pick a candidate with minimum total…
The important Kemeny problem, which consists of computing median consensus rankings of an election with respect to the Kemeny voting rule, admits important applications in biology and computational social choice and was generalized recently…
We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…
Facing an unknown situation, a person may not be able to firmly elicit his/her preferences over different alternatives, so he/she tends to express uncertain preferences. Given a community of different persons expressing their preferences…
Since Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and…
Classical results in voting theory show that strategic manipulation by voters is inevitable if a voting rule simultaneously satisfy certain desirable properties. Motivated by this, we study the relevant question of how often a voting rule…
It is common that a jury must grade a set of candidates in a cardinal scale such as {1,2,3,4,5} or an ordinal scale such as {Great, Good, Average, Bad }. When the number of candidates is very large such as hotels (BOOKING), restaurants…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
We experimentally study voter turnout in two-tier elections when the electorate consists of multiple groups, such as states. Votes are aggregated within the groups by the winner-take-all rule or the proportional rule, and the group-level…
An important desideratum in approval-based multiwinner voting is proportionality. We study the problem of reconfiguring proportional committees: given two proportional committees, is there a transition path that consists only of…
We consider the problem of determining a binary ground truth using advice from a group of independent reviewers (experts) who express their guess about a ground truth correctly with some independent probability (competence). In this…