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We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
We investigate stability of a solution of a hybrid system in the sense that the graphs of solutions from nearby initial conditions remain close and tend towards the graph of the given solution. In this manner, a small continuous-time…
In this paper, we consider the problem of stabilizing discrete-time linear systems by computing a nearby stable matrix to an unstable one. To do so, we provide a new characterization for the set of stable matrices. We show that a matrix $A$…
We consider the stability analysis of a large class of linear 1-D PDEs with polynomial data. This class of PDEs contains, as examples, parabolic and hyperbolic PDEs, PDEs with boundary feedback and systems of in-domain/boundary coupled…
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…
Clustering with most objective functions is NP-Hard, even to approximate well in the worst case. Recently, there has been work on exploring different notions of stability which lend structure to the problem. The notion of stability,…
The Nemhauser-Trotter theorem states that the standard linear programming (LP) formulation for the stable set problem has a remarkable property, also known as (weak) persistency: for every optimal LP solution that assigns integer values to…
We show that given a SM instance G as input we can find a largest collection of pairwise edge-disjoint stable matchings of G in time linear in the input size. This extends two classical results: 1. The Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can find…
We consider the stable assignment problem on a graph with nonnegative real capacities on the edges and quotas on the vertices, in which the preferences of agents are given via diversifying choice functions. We prove that for any input of…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
Popularity is an approach in mechanism design to find fair structures in a graph, based on the votes of the nodes. Popular matchings are the relaxation of stable matchings: given a graph G=(V,E) with strict preferences on the neighbors of…
We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G$ where every vertex has a capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function on the edge set. We assume $G$ admits a perfect matching, i.e.,…
In this paper, we begin by discussing different types of preference profiles related to the stable marriage problem. We then introduce the concept of soulmates, which are a man and a woman who rank each other first. Inversely, we examine…
A decision problem is called parameterized if its input is a pair of strings. One of these strings is referred to as a parameter. The problem: given a propositional logic program P and a non-negative integer k, decide whether P has a stable…
I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
We propose a new integer programming formulation for the problem of finding a maximum stable set of a graph based on representatives of stable sets. In addition, we investigate exact solutions provided by a Lagrangian decomposition of this…