Related papers: Nash Flows Over Time with Tolls
Modeling traffic in road networks is a widely studied but challenging problem, especially under the assumption that drivers act selfishly. A common approach is the deterministic queuing model, for which the structure of dynamic equilibria…
Predicting selfish behavior in public environments by considering Nash equilibria is a central concept of game theory. For the dynamic traffic assignment problem modeled by a flow over time game, in which every particle tries to reach its…
We consider a dynamic model of traffic that has received a lot of attention in the past few years. Users control infinitesimal flow particles aiming to travel from an origin to a destination as quickly as possible. Flow patterns vary over…
In this paper we present a new competitive packet routing model with edge priorities. We consider players that route selfishly through a network over time and try to reach their destinations as fast as possible. If the number of players who…
Flows over time are a natural way to incorporate flow dynamics that arise in various applications such as traffic networks. In this paper we introduce a natural variant of the deterministic fluid queuing model in which users aim to minimize…
Wardrop equilibria in nonatomic congestion games are in general inefficient as they do not induce an optimal flow that minimizes the total travel time. Network tolls are a prominent and popular way to induce an optimum flow in equilibrium.…
In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with capacities, restricting flow rates.…
Dynamic tolls present an opportunity for municipalities to eliminate congestion and fund infrastructure. Imposing tolls that regulate travel along a public highway through monetary fees raise worries of inequity. In this article, we…
We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to…
Motivated by the dynamic traffic assignment problem, we consider flows over time model with deterministic queuing. Dynamic equilibria, called Nash flows over time, have been studied intensively since their introduction by Koch and Skutella…
Congestion pricing has emerged as an effective tool for mitigating traffic congestion, yet implementing welfare or revenue-optimal dynamic tolls is often impractical. Most real-world congestion pricing deployments, including New York City's…
We study a network congestion game of discrete-time dynamic traffic of atomic agents with a single origin-destination pair. Any agent freely makes a dynamic decision at each vertex (e.g., road crossing) and traffic is regulated with given…
The increasing complexity of urban transportation systems, driven by connected and automated vehicles, calls for new modeling paradigms and scalable control strategies. We propose a non-monetary control framework that leverages autonomous…
We study atomic routing games where every agent travels both along its decided edges and through time. The agents arriving on an edge are first lined up in a \emph{first-in-first-out} queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a…
We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the…
Flows over time have received substantial attention from both an optimization and (more recently) a game-theoretic perspective. In this model, each arc has an associated delay for traversing the arc, and a bound on the rate of flow entering…
The analysis of network routing games typically assumes, right at the onset, precise and detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often…
Instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) is a standard game-theoretic concept in dynamic traffic assignment in which individual flow particles myopically select en route currently shortest paths towards their destination. We analyze IDE…
We consider flows over time within the deterministic queueing model and study the solution concept of instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE) in which flow particles select at every decision point a currently shortest path. The length of…
We propose a model of discrete time dynamic congestion games with atomic players and a single source-destination pair. The latencies of edges are composed by free-flow transit times and possible queuing time due to capacity constraints. We…