Related papers: ShuffleV: A Microarchitectural Defense Strategy ag…
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…
Shared cache resources in multi-core processors are vulnerable to cache side-channel attacks. Recently proposed defenses have their own caveats: Randomization-based defenses are vulnerable to the evolving attack algorithms besides relying…
Microarchitectural timing attacks are a type of information leakage attack, which exploit the time-shared microarchitectural components, such as caches, translation look-aside buffers (TLBs), branch prediction unit (BPU), and speculative…
Micro-architectural attacks use information leaked through shared resources to break hardware-enforced isolation. These attacks have been used to steal private information ranging from cryptographic keys to privileged Operating System (OS)…
Evolving attacks on the vulnerabilities of the computing systems demand novel defense strategies to keep pace with newer attacks. This report discusses previous works on side-channel attacks (SCAs) and defenses for cache-targeted and…
Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…
Different from the traditional software vulnerability, the microarchitecture side channel has three characteristics: extensive influence, potent threat, and tough defense. The main reason for the micro-architecture side channel is resource…
Spectre intrusions exploit speculative execution design vulnerabilities in modern processors. The attacks violate the principles of isolation in programs to gain unauthorized private user information. Current state-of-the-art detection…
Attacks on the microarchitecture of modern processors have become a practical threat to security and privacy in desktop and cloud computing. Recently, cache attacks have successfully been demonstrated on ARM based mobile devices, suggesting…
Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…
To defeat side-channel attacks, many recent countermeasures work by enforcing random run-time variability to the target computing platform in terms of clock jitters, frequency and voltage scaling, and phase shift, also combining the…
In the last years, a series of side channels have been discovered on CPUs. These side channels have been used in powerful attacks, e.g., on cryptographic implementations, or as building blocks in transient-execution attacks such as Spectre…
Architecture reverse engineering has become an emerging attack against deep neural network (DNN) implementations. Several prior works have utilized side-channel leakage to recover the model architecture while the target is executing on a…
Cloud computing is a convenient model for processing data remotely. However, users must trust their cloud provider with the confidentiality and integrity of the stored and processed data. To increase the protection of virtual machines, AMD…
Covert channels enable information leakage across security boundaries of the operating system. Microarchitectural covert channels exploit changes in execution timing resulting from competing access to limited hardware resources. We use the…
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such…
Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…
AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) offers protection mechanisms for virtual machines in untrusted environments through memory and register encryption. To separate security-sensitive operations from software executing on the main x86…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer hardware-assisted means to protect code and data. However, as shown in numerous results over the years, attackers can use side-channels to leak data access patterns and even single-step the code.…
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…