Related papers: Achieving Coordination in Non-Cooperative Joint Re…
We address a noncooperative game problem in multi-controller system under delayed and asymmetric information structure. Under these conditions, the classical separation principle fails as estimation and control design become strongly…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
We study an infinite-horizon discrete-time optimal stopping problem under non-exponential discounting. A new method, which we call the iterative approach, is developed to find subgame perfect Nash equilibria. When the discount function…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework,…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…
How to form groups in a mobility system that offers shared rides, and how to split the costs within the travellers of a group, are non-trivial tasks, as two objectives conflict: 1) minimising the total costs of the system, and 2) making…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
We consider autonomous racing of two cars and present an approach to formulate racing decisions as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum game. We design three different games where the players aim to fulfill static track constraints as well as…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies for the traders and…
We address payoff-based decentralized learning in infinite-horizon zero-sum Markov games. In this setting, each player makes decisions based solely on received rewards, without observing the opponent's strategy or actions nor sharing…
This work is concerned with the application of game theoretic principles to model competition between demand response aggregators for selling excess energy stored in electrochemical storage devices directly to other aggregators in a power…
We study the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism, that is widely used to allocate divisible resources. Each agent submits a bid for each divisible resource and receives a fraction proportional to her bids. We quantify the…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…
We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query…
Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…