Related papers: Information Asymmetry in Queues with Strategic Cus…
Giving customers queue length information about a service system has the potential to influence the decision of a customer to join a queue. Thus, it is imperative for managers of queueing systems to understand how the information that they…
Strategic customer behavior is strongly influenced by the level of information that is provided to customers. Hence, to optimize the design of queueing systems, many studies consider various versions of the same service model and compare…
Delay or queue length information has the potential to influence the decision of a customer to use a service system. Thus, it is imperative for service system managers to understand how the information that they provide will affect the…
Understanding how delayed information impacts queueing systems is an important area of research. However, much of the current literature neglects one important feature of many queueing systems, namely non-stationary arrivals. Non-stationary…
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…
In this paper, we consider a new queueing model where queues balance themselves according to a mean field interaction with a time delay. Unlike other work with delayed information our model considers multi-server queues with customer…
This paper studies a service system in which arriving customers are provided with information about the delay they will experience. Based on this information they decide to wait for service or to leave the system. Specifically, every…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium behavior of a single server Markovian queue with dynamic control of the service rate. Customers arrive according a Poisson procedure and the system administrator makes a service rate choice…
When human agents come together to make decisions, it is often the case that one human agent has more information than the other. This phenomenon is called information asymmetry and this distorts the market. Often if one human agent intends…
We study the effect of providing information to agents who queue before a scarce good is distributed at a fixed time. Many information policies reveal "sudden bad news," when agents learn the queue is longer than previously believed. Sudden…
We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…
This paper studies the equilibrium behavior of customers in the Geo/Geo/1 queueing system with multiple working vacations. The arriving customers decide whether to join or to balk the queueing systems based on the information of the queue…
In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a better idea about which…
We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…
Scheduling and managing queues with bounded buffers are among the most fundamental problems in computer networking. Traditionally, it is often assumed that all the properties of each packet are known immediately upon arrival. However, as…
Information asymmetry is a pervasive feature of multi-agent systems, especially evident in economics and social sciences. In these settings, agents tailor their actions based on private information to maximize their rewards. These strategic…
We consider a queue with an unobservable backlog by the incoming users. There is an information designer that observes the queue backlog and makes recommendations to the users arriving at the queue whether to join or not to join the queue.…
This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…
We show that the statistics of spreads in real order books is characterized by an intrinsic asymmetry due to discreteness effects for even or odd values of the spread. An analysis of data from the NYSE order book points out that traders'…
We consider the problem of selfish agents in discrete-time queuing systems, where competitive queues try to get their packets served. In this model, a queue gets to send a packet each step to one of the servers, which will attempt to serve…