Related papers: Stability in Online Assignment Games
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
Residential segregation in metropolitan areas is a phenomenon that can be observed all over the world. Recently, this was investigated via game-theoretic models. There, selfish agents of two types are equipped with a monotone utility…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
In this article we study the stable marriage game induced by the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. Our setting is standard: all the lists are complete and the matching mechanism is the men-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. It is well…
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) systems are two-sided markets, with two mutually exclusive sets of agents, i.e., travelers/users and operators, forming a mobility ecosystem in which multiple operators compete or cooperate to serve customers…
In the online bipartite matching with reassignments problem, an algorithm is initially given only one side of the vertex set of a bipartite graph; the vertices on the other side are revealed to the algorithm one by one, along with its…
We study the stochastic assignment game and extend it to model multimodal mobility markets with a regulator or a Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS) platform. We start by presenting general forms of one-to-one and many-to-many stochastic…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signaling mechanisms, where applicants send a limited number of…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
Fair classification has been a topic of intense study in machine learning, and several algorithms have been proposed towards this important task. However, in a recent study, Friedler et al. observed that fair classification algorithms may…
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a…
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching $k$-stable if no other matching exists that is more…
In this work, we consider a computational model of a distributed system formed by a set of servers in which jobs, that are continuously arriving, have to be executed. Every job is formed by a set of dependent tasks (i.~e., each task may…
In this paper, we study streaming and online algorithms in the context of randomness in the input. For several problems, a random order of the input sequence---as opposed to the worst-case order---appears to be a necessary evil in order to…