Related papers: A Small Collusion is All You Need
In the Bitcoin system, transaction fees serve as an incentive for blockchain confirmations. In general, a transaction with a higher fee is likely to be included in the next block mined, whereas a transaction with a smaller fee or no fee may…
Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) are a family of automated market makers that enable censorship-resistant decentralized exchange on public blockchains. Arbitrage trades have been shown to align the prices reported by CFMMs with those…
Clustering algorithms are widely used in many societal resource allocation applications, such as loan approvals and candidate recruitment, among others, and hence, biased or unfair model outputs can adversely impact individuals that rely on…
Blockchains face inherent limitations when communicating outside their own ecosystem, largely due to the Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) 3f+1 security model. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a promising mitigation because they allow…
Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee…
Lately, Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), i.e., uniquely discernible assets on a blockchain, have skyrocketed in popularity by addressing a broad audience. However, the typical NFT auctioning procedures are conducted in various, ad hoc ways,…
We study whether large language models acting as autonomous bidders can tacitly collude by coordinating when to accept platform posted payouts in repeated Dutch auctions, without any communication. We present a minimal repeated auction…
This paper introduces the Minimum Price Markov Game (MPMG), a theoretical model that reasonably approximates real-world first-price markets following the minimum price rule, such as public auctions. The goal is to provide researchers and…
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…
Blockchains have block-size limits to ensure the entire cluster can keep up with the tip of the chain. These block-size limits are usually single-dimensional, but richer multidimensional constraints allow for greater throughput. The…
Miners in a blockchain system are suffering from ever-increasing storage costs, which in general have not been properly compensated by the users' transaction fees. This reduces the incentives for the miners' participation and may jeopardize…
We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game…
We study an auction with $m$ identical items in a context where $n$ agents can arbitrarily commit to strategies. In general, such commitments non-trivially change the equilibria by inducing a metagame of choosing which strategies to commit…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance. They are smart contracts (stateful programs) running on blockchains. They enable virtual token exchange: traders swap tokens with the AMM for a fee, while liquidity…
Batch auctions are a classical market microstructure, acclaimed for their fairness properties, and have received renewed interest in the context of blockchain-based financial systems. Constant function market makers (CFMMs) are another…
Blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL) has recently gained tremendous attention because of its advantages such as decentralization and privacy protection of raw data. However, there has been few research focusing on the allocation of…
Consensus algorithms are central to blockchain technology and an emerging research area. In this paper, we begin with an overview of the different types and architectures of blockchain networks. Then, with a focus on consortium blockchains,…
Blockchain design involves many tradeoffs, and much debate has focused on tradeoffs related to scaling parameters such as blocksize. To address some of the confusion around this subject, we present a probability proof of the DCS Triangle.…
Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…
All public blockchains are secured by a proof of opportunity cost among block producers. For example, the security offered by proof-of-work (PoW) systems, like Bitcoin, is due to spent computation; it is work precisely because it cannot be…