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Advanced reasoning models with agentic capabilities (AI agents) are deployed to interact with humans and to solve sequential decision-making problems under (approximate) utility functions and internal models. When such problems have…
We stress-tested 16 leading models from multiple developers in hypothetical corporate environments to identify potentially risky agentic behaviors before they cause real harm. In the scenarios, we allowed models to autonomously send emails…
Contemporary benchmarks for agentic artificial intelligence (AI) frequently evaluate safety through isolated task-level accuracy thresholds, implicitly treating autonomous systems as single points of failure. This single-channel paradigm…
As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, existing safety evaluations face a fundamental trade-off: manual benchmarks are costly, while LLM-based simulators are scalable but suffer from logic hallucination. We present…
AI incident reporting requirements are emerging in regulation and policy, yet no operational criteria exist for determining when a detected AI incident warrants escalation beyond national handling to international coordination. This paper…
AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We…
Automated control monitors could play an important role in overseeing highly capable AI agents that we do not fully trust. Prior work has explored control monitoring in simplified settings, but scaling monitoring to real-world deployments…
Agentic AIs $-$ AIs that are capable and permitted to undertake complex actions with little supervision $-$ mark a new frontier in AI capabilities and raise new questions about how to safely create and align such systems with users,…
Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the…
We report a safety incident in a deployed multi-agent research system in which a primary AI agent installed 107 unauthorized software components, overwrote a system registry, overrode a prior negative decision from an oversight agent, and…
Autonomy is a double-edged sword for AI agents, simultaneously unlocking transformative possibilities and serious risks. How can agent developers calibrate the appropriate levels of autonomy at which their agents should operate? We argue…
Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond…
The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing…
AI emotional companions face a safety-rapport paradox: restrictive safeguards can damage supportive alliance, while permissive systems risk user harm. We present SLIP (Staged Layers of Intervention Protocol), a four-stage graduated…
Real-world requests to AI agents are fundamentally underspecified. Natural human communication relies on shared context and unstated constraints that speakers expect listeners to infer. Current agentic benchmarks test explicit…
Agentic AI systems, specifically LLM-driven agents that plan, invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and delegate tasks to peer agents via protocols such as MCP and A2A, introduce a threat surface that differs materially from standalone…
Indirect prompt injection attacks threaten AI agents that execute consequential actions, motivating deterministic system-level defenses. Such defenses can provably block unsafe actions by enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies,…
Recent AI systems combine large language models with tools, external knowledge via retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), and even autonomous multi-agent decision loops. This agentic AI paradigm greatly expands capabilities - but also vastly…
The acquisition of agentic capabilities has transformed LLMs from "knowledge providers" to "action executors", a trend that while expanding LLMs' capability boundaries, significantly increases their susceptibility to malicious use. Previous…
As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is becoming a practical deployment concern. Current benchmarks for AI agents primarily evaluate refusal of…