Related papers: Persuasion in Lemons Markets
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller observes a private sample that may be either accurate (coinciding…
A platform charges a producer for disclosing quality evidence to consumers before trade. It aims to maximize its revenue guarantee across potentially multiple equilibria which arise from the interdependence of producer purchase decisions…
We study a bilateral trade problem where a principal has private information that is revealed with delay, such as a seller who does not yet know her production cost. Postponing the contracting process incurs a costly delay, while early…
We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and…
We address the challenge of solving machine learning tasks using data from privacy-sensitive sellers. Since the data is private, we design a data market that incentivizes sellers to provide their data in exchange for payments. Therefore our…
An expert seller chooses an experiment to influence a client's purchasing decision, but may manipulate the experiment result for personal gain. When credibility surpasses a critical threshold, the expert chooses a fully-revealing experiment…
In market modeling, one often treats buyers as a homogeneous group. In this paper we consider buyers with heterogeneous preferences and products available in many variants. Such a framework allows us to successfully model various market…
A designer relies on an experimenter to provide information to a decision maker, but the experimenter has incentives to persuade rather than merely transmit information. Anticipating this motive, the designer can restrict the set of…
In online advertising systems, publishers often face a trade-off in information disclosure strategies: while disclosing more information can enhance efficiency by enabling optimal allocation of ad impressions, it may lose revenue potential…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
A multiproduct seller is more informed than consumers about the value of her products to consumers. The seller posts a price list and segments the market through cheap-talk communication. We find that when both seller's and consumers'…
We develop a market model in which products generate state-dependent potential hidden charges. Firms differ in their ability to realize this potential. Unlike firms, consumers do not observe the state. They try to infer hidden charges from…
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…
When selling information products, the seller can provide some free partial information to change people's valuations so that the overall revenue can possibly be increased. We study the general problem of advertising information products by…
We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…
In many cases, assessing the quality of goods is hard. For example, when purchasing a car, it is hard to measure how pollutant the car is since there are infinitely many driving conditions to be tested. Typically, these situations are…
This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…